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ABSTRACT 
This research program aimed to identify the factors that influence the Voluntary Donation 
payment decision in a cohort of parents (N = 250) with a child (or children) at a New Zealand 
state school. A voluntary donation is a charitable contribution to the running of the school 
collected from the parents of the school‘s students. A survey questionnaire was constructed to 
examine the attitudes parents hold towards the voluntary donation funding system, the current 
New Zealand Government and the school the respondent‘s child attends. The parents were 
‗naturally‘ separated into two conditions based on their last voluntary donation payment 
decision – Paid versus Not Paid – to compare the differences in attitudes on the various 
statements from the survey and their demographic composition. The results revealed that 
payment decision was positively correlated with educational achievement, annual household 
income and age. Individual contributions exhibited strong positive relationships with beliefs 
about the contributions of others, which was consistent with previous public goods field 
experiments. The research extended the existing public goods research by examining the 
social norms of voluntary donation behaviour and assimilating the results with theories of 
altruism, conditional cooperation and reciprocity. The strongest overall contribution to the 
prediction of payment decision was parents‘ attitudes towards the current Government and 
the voluntary donation funding system. The results identified that pressures existed in the 
voluntary donation environment, a result most prevalent in high decile schools. Additionally, 
a marginal level of comprehension of the voluntary donations characterised the majority of 
respondents. Overall, the research found that the best predictor of contribution was attitudes 
towards the voluntary donation funding system. 
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“What the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that must the community want for 
all its children. Any other ideal for our schools is narrow and unlovely, acted upon, it 
destroys our democracy.” 
- John Dewey, „The School and Society‟, 1915, p. 19. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The policy of free education in New Zealand is currently under threat. The use of 
Voluntary Donation funding in state schools – which permits a school to request charitable 
contributions from the families of its students – is a controversial element of the education 
system in this country. The ability of a school to appeal for donations from families has 
divided public opinion because it challenges the right of all New Zealanders to a government 
provided education. Consequently, many education critics conclude that free schooling is 
now a myth (Nichols, 2007).  
The state education system, and its voluntary donation source of funding, 
encompasses the features of a privately provisioned public good, allowing the investigation 
of public goods theory from an innovative perspective. While public goods are a thoroughly 
investigated empirical subject, the analysis of field experiments lacks the same extensive 
coverage. The current study aimed to investigate the voluntary donation funding system by 
examining the factors that influence the contribution decision of a parent, before assimilating 
the findings with current public goods theory. 
 
The New Zealand Education System 
According to the United Nation‘s Education Index, the education system in New 
Zealand is ranked the fourth highest in the world (United Nation‘s Human Development 
Report, 2008). New Zealand‘s adult literacy and school enrolment rates are among the 
highest of any global society, demonstrating the strength of the school system in this country. 
It is estimated that there are currently 764,398 children enrolled in New Zealand schools, 
which infers that nearly twenty percent of the population of this country is enrolled at a 
primary, intermediate or secondary education facility (Statistics New Zealand, 2010). The 
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government funded State and State-Integrated education systems cover about ninety-three 
percent of these school enrolments (Mallard, 2005). With an emerging trend of placing 
government spending under the microscope, the education system has become a fresh area for 
public scrutiny, highlighting the need for empirical investigation to arbitrate the associated 
media focus.  
 
State School Funding 
The Education Act 1989 entitles every child, between the ages of five and nineteen, to 
the right of free enrolment and free education at one of New Zealand‘s 2,563 state schools 
(Ministry of Education, 2009). The privilege of free education is, however, currently under 
threat because the government funding provided to state schools is often considered 
insufficient. The New Zealand Council for Education Research (NZCER) released a report
 
detailing the results from a 2006 – 2007 national survey on school resources. The survey 
found that ―for all stakeholder groups (principals, teachers, school trustees and parents) in 
both primary and secondary schools, funding was identified as the major issue affecting 
schools,‖  (Wylie & King, 2009, p. xviii). An additional report on school funding, identified 
that many schools were ―unable to meet all their operational costs by use of their government 
grant alone,‖ (Wylie & King, 2005, p. viii). The review found that only twelve percent of the 
state schools surveyed were in a comfortable financial position, and able to consider future 
development of their education programmes and infrastructure (Wylie & King, 2005). The 
NZCER report concluded that the pressures on school budgets remained problematic, and 
were intensifying (Wylie & King, 2009). 
The New Zealand School Trustees Association (NZSTA) tracks the spending of 
schools and compiles financial information for Board of Trustees training and development. 
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A report from the Association found that one school had overspent its government provided 
budget by eleven percent in 2005, and that this amount had expanded to forty-two percent by 
2007 (Kerr, 2007). Even though most schools possessed ―robust systems of budget 
development and monitoring, and employed experienced administration staff to implement 
this, the majority still had problems meeting the financial demands of running a school.‖ The 
vast majority ran on ―thin margins, and took a conservative approach to financial 
management and programme changes,‖ (Wylie & King, 2005, p. viii). The Wylie and King 
report also found that school administrations had to manage their finances very carefully, and 
were not able to cover all the support for students, which they considered they should be 
providing. Principals of fifty-five percent of the secondary schools surveyed and forty-seven 
percent of the primary schools noted shortfalls in funding. From the review, only one percent 
of secondary schools, and eleven percent of primary schools, considered they were 
adequately resourced. In addition, the Boards of Trustees of forty-five percent of schools 
expressed that their school had encountered financial management issues in the previous 
three years (Wylie & King, 2005). 
All New Zealand schools have the right to raise additional capital to supplement the 
operational allowance received from the government. The amount raised by schools has 
increased substantially since the introduction of school self-management in 1989, which 
allowed schools to govern their own finances and boost additional funding from external 
sources when necessary. Statistics from the Ministry of Education found that state schools 
raised $500 million in additional funding in 2005. This non-government financial support 
increased to $712 million in 2007, which equates to over ten percent of annual school funding 
(Ministry of Education, 2009). An NZCER article extended this figure, reporting that, on 
average, state schools raised seventeen percent of their operational budgets from 
supplementary funding. In addition, twenty-six percent of secondary schools reported 
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collecting more from locally raised revenue, than they received from the Government 
(Schagen & Wylie, 2004). The majority of supplementary funding is sourced from grants, 
sponsorship, international students, community fundraising and parental voluntary donations 
(Education Review Office, 2007). This extra funding is becoming increasingly necessary as 
the population grows and education becomes more expensive. In the past several years, costs 
of support staff, information and communication technology, and property rents have all 
increased (Schagen & Wylie, 2004). Additionally, international student numbers have 
declined, cutting revenue upon which some secondary schools have come to rely on (Wylie 
& King, 2004). It has been widely publicised that without supplementary revenue, the 
majority of state schools would not remain financially viable (Rudman, 2008; Woulfe, 2008). 
The Ministry of Education (2009) acknowledges that the government provided, 
operational budget may be insufficient to resource all schools, but contend that spending on 
education has increased appreciably over the past decade. The Government is consistently 
under pressure to increase funding for education, and negate the need for schools to raise 
additional funding. In addition, the current financial climate has placed the Government 
under considerable fiscal stress creating options, which circumvent taxes, particularly 
attractive. Voluntary contribution institutions, the voluntary donation system for example, 
offer this feature, and therefore represent a potentially viable option to supplement the tax-
financed mechanism for providing public goods (Croson & Marks, 1998). John Morris, 
Headmaster of Auckland Grammar, concurs, ―[g]overnment funding will never be enough to 
run schools and hence school donations are one way of being able to maintain [the] excellent 
standard of education that people expect,‖ (Cited In: Smith, 2009, p. 1). 
Former Education Minister Trevor Mallard, clearly stated that, ―compulsory 
attendance fees have no place in the state education system,‖ (Mallard, 2001), which 
illustrates that requesting a fee from parents is strictly prohibited. The Education Review 
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Office (ERO), a government funded research service of the Ministry of Education, is charged 
with reprimanding the schools that are caught breaking the rules. Frequent reviews of the 
voluntary donation system allow the Ministry to caution schools that request compulsory fees 
for core syllabus, or which pressure parents into paying the donations. In a recent report, the 
ERO inspectors found that eleven of the two-hundred and eighteen schools reviewed, called 
donations ‗fees‘ or ‗term payments‘, and did not make it clear that the payments were 
‗optional‘ donations (Education Review Office, 2007). The review inferred that thousands of 
other families in New Zealand were being charged incorrectly. The Ministry, however, has 
little power to punish the offending schools, except for pointing out the fault. Lorraine Kerr, 
president of the NZSTA, supports a schools right to request donations due to the shortfall in 
government funding. Kerr states that ―trying to get money out of the community by whatever 
means – by calling a payment whatever name – is a [school] board‘s desperate way of 
actually trying to top up [funding] inadequacy,‖ (Kerr, 2007, p. 1).  
 
School Decile Rating Index 
 The New Zealand Government in conjunction with the Ministry of Education created 
the school‘s decile rating system to assure equality of educational opportunities across all 
socio-economic communities (Ministry of Education, 2005). The decile rating system 
(decile) was developed to allocate targeted funding based on the socio-economic 
characteristics of a school (for a comprehensive explanation see the Methodology section). A 
school‘s decile rating takes into account household income, employment status, educational 
achievement, income support and household size, and uses ten subdivisions, each containing 
ten percent of schools (Mallard, 2001). The decile of a school indicates the extent that the 
school draws its students from low socio-economic communities. Higher deciles reflect the 
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higher socio-economic status of the school‘s community. The existence of a ranked school 
funding system has divided academics who believe it ‗stigmatises schools‘, and creates 
‗social segregation‘. The critics propose that funding should instead be based on school 
performance (Langley, 2008). Thrupp (2008, p. 1) contends, stating, ―decile funding is a way 
of partly compensating schools for socio-economic disadvantage. It provides low socio-
economic schools with the extra funding needed to buy resources or employ support staff.‖ 
Thrupp posits that decile funding is indispensable because of the recognised global trend that 
fewer children from low socio-economic backgrounds acquire school qualifications, 
compared to high socio-economic students. This observation creates an environment where 
disproportionate school funding, based on socio-economic requirements, is a necessary tool 
(Thrupp, 2008).  
Under the decile rating system, the Government considered that schools with higher 
proportions of affluent families have a better chance of raising additional funding, 
specifically through parental voluntary contributions (Langley, 2008). The schools with the 
highest decile rating, therefore, receive the least government funding, because they will 
(theoretically) collect the balance from the voluntary donations. Over the past few years, this 
assumption has been disproven, with many high decile schools struggling with voluntary 
donation collection rates (Marvin, 2009; Smith, 2009). Media correspondence with school 
principals has revealed that high decile schools raise more than half of their funding from 
compulsory fees, international students and voluntary donations (Nichols, 2007), and the 
level of lost income from uncollected voluntary donations is severely affecting the schools. 
Some schools have even employed personal research in an attempt to understand the reasons 
for the decrease in donations (Personal Communication, 2010). Even though low decile 
schools receive higher per student subsidies from government funding, many require a 
substantial amount from the voluntary donations, or other sources of supplementary funding. 
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In addition, high decile schools commonly request much higher donations from parents to 
supplement the lack of government funding, compared to the donation requests of low decile 
schools. 
 
The Voluntary Donation Funding System 
As defined by the Ministry of Education (2009), the Voluntary Donations are 
charitable contributions to the running of the school collected from the parents or caregivers 
of the pupils attending the school. The majority of New Zealand state schools annually 
request a per-student contribution to supplement their government funding (Education 
Review Office, 2007). The voluntary donations are a substantial contributor to the 
supplementary funding collected by state schools. 
In recent times, it has been well publicised by way of extensive media coverage, that 
many schools are struggling to promote a successful learning environment for pupils due to a 
lack of funding (―The Cost of Free Education‖, 2009; Fea, 2009; Woulfe, 2009; Smith, 
2009). A major cause of the deficit is the steady decline of the amount collected through the 
voluntary donations (Education Review Office, 2007; Smith, 2009). The latest NZCER 
national survey found that schools are continually attempting to raise additional income to 
help ease budget pressures. In the report, one in four secondary schools, and one in six 
primary schools, admitted to increasing the amount requested from the voluntary donations 
over the past two years. Although, many principals reported that a substantial number of 
parents did not pay (Wylie & King, 2009). Earlier reports state that increased resistance to 
paying the donations was becoming a more common problem for schools (Wylie & King, 
2005; Woulfe, 2008). The reduction in donation rates has placed significant pressure on 
schools to remain financially viable and in some cases stay out of debt (Fea, 2009). Some 
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schools have stopped requesting a donation, as the cost and effort involved in collection was 
often going unrewarded (Smith, 2009). Voluntary donation payment rates have reached all 
time lows in recent years, (perhaps due, in part, to the global economic climate over the past 
24 months) with a high decile school reporting a contribution rate of thirty-three percent (Fea, 
2009). The majority of state schools declare that annual voluntary donations are a necessity 
due to financial shortcomings and are persistent that an ―increased reliance on the [voluntary] 
donations has rendered the concept of free education a myth,‖ (Rudman, 2008, p. 1). 
Standard voluntary donations range from around $20 per student for low decile 
schools, to well over $800 per student for more prestigious, high decile schools (Education 
Review Office, 2007; Woulfe, 2008). In 2005, the average contribution requested as a 
voluntary donation was $125 per student for primary schools, and $275 per student for 
secondary schools (Education Review Office, 2006). As a proportion of total supplementary 
funding, the voluntary donations comprised, on average, ten percent for primary schools, and 
fourteen percent for secondary schools (Education Review Office, 2007). The payments are 
requested quarterly (each term), six-monthly or as an annual lump sum. Many schools even 
allow part payments, or weekly instalments, in order to make the donations as affordable as 
possible. This researcher found that a general guideline for voluntary donation payment 
proportion is that schools, on average, collect between seven and nine percent of the 
voluntary donations they request, for every decile rating ‗point‘. For example, a decile three 
school could expect a voluntary donation payment rate of between twenty-one and twenty-
seven percent, whereas a school with a decile nine rating could expect a payment rate of 
between sixty-three and eighty-one percent (Personal Communication, 2009; 2010). Official 
accounts agree, with a recent report revealing secondary school collection rates at between 
twenty and ninety-five percent (Education Review Office, 2007). These statistics show that 
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there is huge variance in the proportion of families that do not pay the donation, especially in 
high decile schools (i.e. Decile 6 – 10) (Fea, 2009; Forbes, 2009).  
The tension surrounding the voluntary donations has led schools to form impressions 
regarding the motivations of the parents who do not pay the donations. The prevailing 
conclusion is that two categories of non-contributing parents exist: those who cannot afford 
to cover the costs of the donations, and those who choose not to donate because there are no 
consequences for non-payment (Smith, 2009). From an economic perspective, this is 
unsurprising, but it is a concern for schools, and the Ministry of Education, due to the level of 
lost income.  
 
The tension surrounding the voluntary donation funding system is most pertinent in 
the opinions of parents who are expected to contribute. The current investigation of a cohort 
of parents with children at a selection of state schools, examined parental attitudes towards 
the voluntary donation environment, to identify the factors that influence payment decision. 
The research aimed to lend additional empirical evidence to the private provision of public 
goods literature by using the voluntary donation funding system as an example of a social 
dilemma (Dawes, 1980). The researcher employed economic techniques in an attempt to 
assimilate the findings with current public goods research. 
 
ECONOMIC THEORY 
In the economic discipline, a myriad of research has focussed on the examination of 
public goods (For example: Ones & Putterman, 2007; Andreoni, 1990; 1995; Croson & 
Marks, 1998; Isaac & Walker, 1988; 1992; Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007; See: Ledyard, 
1995 for a review). In particular, the private provision of public goods, and the behaviour of 
an individual within a group, is the focus of investigation for both theoretical and 
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experimental researchers. In his ground breaking book The Logic of Collective Action, 
Mancur Olson (1965, p. 2) introduces the idea that ―rational, self-interested individuals will 
not act [together] to achieve their common or group interests‖. Current research in the field 
attempts to build on Olson‘s observations and provide better explanations for the behaviour 
of individuals, and the ‗group mentality‘ that exists within collections of related and unrelated 
people. John Ledyard introduces one of the more influential reviews in the public goods 
literature by stating that ―some of the most fundamental questions about the organisation of 
society centre on issues raised by the presence of public goods,‖ (Ledyard, 1995, p. 1). He 
continues, positing that ―research on the voluntary provision of public goods must come to 
grips with this simple but still unanswered question about the fundamental nature of 
humankind – Are people selfish or cooperative?‖  
Important questions of whether we can depend on the market to provide an optimal 
amount of a public good, and how effectively we can rely on ‗natural‘ processes, such as 
voluntary contributions, to solve environmental problems, come down to fundamental issues 
about human nature (Chen, 1999). The topic remains at the forefront of the rapidly expanding 
experimental landscape because at the most basic level, voluntary contributions to public 
goods defy fundamental economic theory (Chaudhuri, 2007). The debate centres on theories 
of dependent behaviour, private benefits and social pressures as economists, sociologists and 
psychologists attempt to draw conclusions from the surfeit of investigations that colour the 
academic terrain. 
 
Public Goods 
By the economic definition, a Public Good is a good or service that is non-
rivalrous and non-excludable. The term non-rivalry implies that consumption of a good by an 
individual does not prevent simultaneous consumption from other individuals, and, in its 
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purest form, non-excludability infers that once a good has been produced, it is impossible to 
prevent individuals from gaining access to it (Blakeley et al., 2005).  A pure public good has 
perfect non-rivalry of consumption, and consequently an increase in the number of 
consumers exploiting the good, does not reduce the marginal benefit available to other 
consumers (Berlemann et al., 2004). Additionally, pure public goods are non-excludable, as 
preventing the consumption of an individual or group, would incur prohibitive costs (Kaul et 
al., 1999). In contrast, impure public goods are non-excludable and impurely non-rivaled. 
From this definition, an impure public good can be utilised by multiple consumers, but an 
increase in the number of consumers may diminish the marginal benefit to each consumer. 
This explanation implies a negative relationship between the number of individuals who 
exploit the public good and the benefit received by each individual from consumption of the 
good (Isaac & Walker, 1988). A review of the public goods literature reveals that many 
economists contend the existence of perfect examples of pure public goods outside the 
laboratory. Accordingly, the majority of research into the phenomenon is through public 
goods games, in which manipulation of conditions, and experimental control, allow for causal 
judgement and theoretical inspection. In opposition, a growing number of researchers 
conclude that certain goods approximate the impure public good concept adequately for field 
analysis to be academically useful (Shang & Croson, 2009; Levin, 1987). 
For an adequate understanding of public goods, it is prudent to provide an explanation 
of private goods. A private good is effectively the opposite of a public good, in that it is both 
excludable and rivalled (McEachern, 2009). Thus, the consumption of a private good by one 
consumer prevents simultaneous consumption by other consumers and, it is (reasonably) 
possible to exclude an individual or group from consumption of the good (e.g. non-
contributors). The major difference between private and public goods is one of profitability. 
Due to the non-rivalry and non-excludability of a public good, it is impossible for private 
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enterprise to supply them for profit (McEachern, 2009). To solve this problem, society 
entrusts governments with the provision of the majority of public goods (Chaudhuri, 2007).  
 
Funding Of Public Goods 
A number of public goods rely on private provision, through voluntary contributions 
from individuals, to supplement (or substitute) the public provision received from the 
government. This causes a social dilemma for society, whereby individuals must decide 
whether to contribute to a public good or free ride (Rege, 2004). The game theoretic 
expectation is that there will be no contributions to the public good from rational, self-
interested persons. Strictly logical thinking suggests that public goods that rely on voluntary 
contributions will cease to be available, illustrated by the classic Tragedy of the Commons 
(Hardin, 1968). This typically leads economists to call for the provision of public goods via 
tax revenue rather than depend on private contributions (Chaudhuri, 2007). 
Government funding can have a direct effect on private contributions to public goods. 
Whilst government spending funds the majority of public goods, research has concluded that 
public provision may ‗crowd out‘ the charitable contributions of individuals and be 
detrimental to total supply (Andreoni, 1993). A study from Abrams and Schmitz (1978) 
employed a longitudinal study and regressed private charitable donations on government 
expenditure for health-care, education, and welfare. Their estimates indicate that a one dollar 
increase in government funding had a strong crowding-out effect and lowered private 
charitable contributions by twenty-eight cents. Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984) presented 
theoretical evidence that government funding results in a ‗dollar for dollar‘ reduction in 
private contributions to public goods, a finding that has been extended to subsidies 
(Bernheim, 1986; Andreoni, 1988). In theory, a partial government subsidy would create an 
environment in which society strictly enforces a social norm of voluntary contribution. 
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Contrastingly, complete government funding would remove the need for society to enforce 
private provision of a public good (Rege, 2004). 
The accepted prediction of neo-classical economic theory is that, in general, public 
goods would be undersupplied by voluntary contributions. Nevertheless, economists have 
revealed that there are many important instances in which public goods are voluntarily 
supplied from private provision. The obvious example is contributions to charity (Roberts, 
1984), but this can also be extended to the campaign funds of political parties (Bergstrom et 
al., 1985), public television broadcasting (Andreoni, 1995) and public radio stations (Shang 
& Croson, 2009).  
 
Public Goods Games 
Investigation of the theoretical implications of the private provision of public goods is 
through the very common experiments called Public Goods Games. A public goods game is a 
multi-person analogue of the prisoner‟s dilemma game, where participants must choose how 
to distribute an endowment between their personal fund and the public good account (Isaac & 
Walker, 1988). These laboratory experiments are designed to preserve neutrality and 
minimise social incentives in a controlled environment (Andreoni, 1995). The basic principle 
in a standard public goods game is that each participant begins with an endowment of 
resources (most commonly money), and can then choose to transfer a portion of their 
endowment to the public good, in much the same way as an individual would through 
charitable donations (For a review: Ledyard, 1995). The public good account is typically 
increased (e.g. double the total contribution), to provide an incentive for an individual to 
contribute, by improving the marginal per capita return from an individual‘s personal 
contribution. The public good account is then divided between all of the individuals, who 
each receive an equal distribution of the total (Hsu, 2008).  
14 | P a g e  
In a highly simplified version, three ‗players‘ each begin with a $20 endowment. 
Player A decides, that he will contribute $10 of his endowment to the public good. Player B, 
in congruence with the free riding hypothesis, contributes $0 of his endowment, and Player C 
contributes all of his endowment ($20) to the public good. The contributions are collected 
($30), and the total doubled ($30 x 2 = $60), before being divided equally between the group 
members. After distribution of the public good, Player A has $30, the $10 that was not 
contributed plus one third of the public good ($20), Player B has $40, the original $20 that 
was not contributed and one third of the public good ($20), and Player C only has the $20 
from the public good. According to game theory, free riding in public goods games will be 
the dominant strategy equilibrium (Chaudhuri, 2007) because the marginal per capita return 
for a one dollar contribution is always less than one dollar (Ledyard, 1995). It is theorised 
that participants in public good games will act rationally to maximise their personal gain by 
employing the theory of marginal per capita return to judge the potential benefit of 
contribution. The marginal per capita return (MPCR) from a public good is defined as the 
ratio of benefits to costs from an individual‘s contribution to a public good (Laury et al., 
1999). Put simply, every dollar of contribution yields a diminished benefit to the contributor, 
irrelevant of the contribution of the other group members. For the above example, the total 
contribution to the public good account is doubled, and divided by the number of participants 
(in this case three), therefore the benefit received by an individual from a contribution of one 
dollar is 66 cents (MPCR = ($1 x 2) / 3).  Even though the prediction of perfect free riding is 
incorrect, individuals appear to respond to the marginal per capita return concept in a logical 
and mathematical way (Ledyard, 1995). 
Generally, three significant observations are consistently replicated in public goods 
games (Eichberger & Kelsey, 2002). Individuals will contribute (on average) around half of 
their endowment to the public good, however the level of contribution will decrease (decay) 
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over repeated instances of the experiment (Andreoni, 1988). In addition, whilst free riding is 
often approximated, exact free riding is seldom realised (Isaac & Walker, 1988).  
 
Public Goods Problems 
An inspection of neo-classical game theory demonstrates that because individuals act 
with individualistic, self-oriented motivations, the desires of the group are often overlooked. 
The idea that groups will act in support of their group interests is supposed to follow logically 
from the widely accepted premise that the individuals within the group will be self-interested 
and rational (Olson, 1965). This is often not the case because the rationality of individuals is 
idiosyncratic and fundamentally selfish. An excerpt from the Theory of Groups summarises 
this point, ―even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, and 
would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will 
still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group interest,‖ (Olson, 1971, p. 2).  
The contentiousness surrounding the private provision of public goods exists because 
an individual has no incentive to contribute to the public good; put simply, a contribution 
does not produce a tangible marginal benefit for the contributor. Given the difficulty (and 
expense) of excluding non-contributors from the consumption of a public good, a common 
problem in the provision of public goods is the existence of free riding (Chaudhuri, 2007). 
Public goods theory predicts that, if reprisal is unlikely, rational individuals will avoid 
contributing to a public good by adopting free riding behaviour (Andreoni, 1988). The free 
rider hypothesis (See: Davis & Hold, 1993 for a review) forecasts that individuals tend to 
withhold contributing to a public good, in the hope that others will contribute (Andreoni, 
1995; Champ et al., 1997). The theory posits that individuals act according to neo-classical 
game theory in order to maximise their personal wealth by not contributing to public goods. 
Andreoni (1995, p. 891) summarises this position, contributing that ―theories of free riding 
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predict that public goods should have very few contributors, and the contributions should be 
very small‖.  
Free riding is termed a public goods ‗problem‘ because it is an example of a social 
dilemma. Economists have long recognised the ‗dilemma‘ – that individual incentives are at 
odds with group interests – at the theoretical level (Ledyard, 1995). A social dilemma 
develops when each individual in a group has a ―clear and unambiguous incentive to make a 
choice that – when made by all members – provides poorer outcomes for all than they would 
have received if none had made the choice,‖ (Dawes & Messick, 2000, p. 111). In this reality, 
each individual receives a greater benefit from defecting than from cooperating, but the 
individuals would be better off if all cooperated rather than if all defected (Schroeder, 1995). 
In other words, the reasonable and rational behaviour of an individual results in each 
individual receiving fewer benefits than they would have if they had acted unreasonably and 
irrationally (Dawes & Messick, 2000).  
The observations of public goods games, in conjunction with field research, have led 
to the creation of two dominant theoretical pathways as explanations for the behaviours 
observed within a typical experiment. Firstly, as outlined by the game theoretic hypothesis, 
neo-classical economic theory predicts that all individuals will free ride and not contribute 
anything to the public good (Ledyard, 1995). From this position, the public good would be 
under-funded by voluntary private provision alone. Conversely, the behavioural-economic 
theory – which encompasses a surfeit of behavioural models – predicts that the individuals in 
a group will contribute something to the public good, and this may extend to complete 
cooperation. Ledyard (1995) posits that the effect of social norms, cooperation or altruism 
will lead each participant to contribute a proportion of their endowment, reducing the conflict 
between individual and group motives, and approximating the group optimal outcome. 
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Research into public goods games has led economists and psychologists to reject both 
theories as inadequate for explaining the standard observation. Many researchers conclude 
that the evidence points towards a weak free rider hypothesis (Fischbacher & Gächter, 2006) 
and a common outcome from the literature is that total contributions are expected to rest mid-
way between no contribution and the group optimum – complete contribution from all 
members (Ledyard, 1995). The complexity of private provision to public goods has led 
researchers to posit a ‗library‘ of potential theoretical solutions to the public goods problem 
(For example: Brandt et al., 2003; Croson, 2007; Sefton et al., 2007). These theories aim to 
extend the public goods literature by providing resolutions to the inadequacy of neo-classical 
game theory, and clarifying the complexity of the behavioural models.  
 
Solutions to the Public Goods Problem 
 The observations of public goods games, in conjunction with public goods field 
experiments, have led researchers to reassess the model of giving in order to rationalise the 
behaviour of individuals. Under neo-classical game theory (neo-classical theory), positive 
contributions to public goods are considered irrational (Fehr & Schmidt, 2005). Over the past 
two decades, advancements in the investigation of public goods have led both economists and 
psychologists to reject the predictions of neo-classical theory as insufficient to explain the 
behaviour of individuals (Brandt et al., 2003). Thus, new theories, which offer better 
solutions to the public goods problem, have become fundamental to the extension of 
knowledge in the field (Chaudhuri, 2007).  
Rival theorists have posited multiple solutions to the social dilemma of public goods 
in order to explain the underlying motivations governing the psychology of giving. Research 
has shown that motives of human behaviour such as cooperation, altruism, warm-glow and 
kindness (Andreoni, 1990; Rege & Telle, 2004), and informational factors such as confusion 
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and identifiability (Andreoni, 1995; Croson & Marks, 1998), have a substantial influence on 
the likelihood of an individual to voluntarily donate money to a public good. In addition, the 
discipline is continually expanding to include the effects that behavioural motives, such as 
guilt aversion, fairness, reciprocity and conformity have on cooperation (Fehr & Schmidt, 
2006). Olson (1965, p. 60) posits that, ―people are sometimes motivated by a desire to win 
prestige, respect, friendship, and other social and psychological objectives,‖ and, as Becker 
(1974, p. 1083) observed, ―apparent charitable behaviour can also be motivated by a desire to 
avoid the scorn of others or to receive social acclaim.‖ Whilst there are a vast number of 
theories and investigations, which attempt to solve the social dilemma of private provision to 
public goods, only the relevant mechanisms, and some of the major contributions to the 
literature, are reviewed in this section. 
An exception to neo-classical theory that has gained recognition from economists is 
the study of simple altruism (Rabin, 1993). Altruism, where an individual derives personal 
utility from the combination of their own consumption and the consumption (or utility) of 
others (Shang & Croson, 2009), is surprisingly common amongst unrelated people even when 
no reciprocation is likely or forthcoming (Fletcher & Zwick, 2007). The theory relies on 
individuals gaining a private benefit from unselfishly placing the interests of the group ahead 
of their own, in an attempt to provide philanthropic benefit to society. Thus, an altruist is 
willing to sacrifice their own resources in order to improve the well-being of others (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 2006). An important consequence of altruism is that an individual‘s contribution 
can be ‗crowded-out‘ by the contributions of others (Roberts, 1984). As contributions from 
others (or from the government) increase, the utility gained from personal contributions to the 
public good will decrease, resulting in lower contributions from an individual (Shang & 
Croson, 2009). Nonetheless, altruism has support from many academics as a motivating 
factor for the voluntary contribution mechanism (Andreoni, 1990). Prevailing research has 
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concluded that altruism alone is ineffective at explaining deviations from neo-classical theory 
(Sugden, 1984) and investigation into new behavioural factors is thriving. 
With altruism rejected as a sufficient explanation for cooperative behaviours, 
investigation has continued into inter-individual factors that encourage public good 
contributions (Fischbacher & Gächter, 2006). Past research proposed that social norms, 
which enforce cooperation in public good situations, lead to an increase in contributions 
(North, 1981; Andreoni, 1990; Hollander, 1990). A social norm is a rule of behaviour, which 
is enforced by social sanctions (Coleman, 1990). Axelrod (1986) suggests that the most 
common definitions of social norms are based upon expectations, values, and behaviour. The 
proposition is that a norm exists, in a given social setting, to the extent that individuals 
usually behave in a certain way, and are punished when others perceive them to be violating 
this behaviour. The social norm of an action is established by the enforcement of principles 
that groups use to govern appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. The observation of an 
individual‘s failure to obey these socially accepted behavioural norms may result in social 
disapproval from others in the group (Sefton et al., 2007). Alternatively, the observation that 
an individual is acting appropriately, in accordance with the social norm, may result in social 
approval from other members of the group. 
The desire to receive positive affect and to avoid negative social discourse, or perhaps 
a combination of the two, is likely to be one of the major contributing factors that underlie 
public goods contributions. As Bergstrom et al. (1985, p. 26) states, ―those who desire the 
good opinion of their neighbours may believe the size of their own contributions to have an 
importance beyond their effect on total supply.‖ From this perspective, individuals derive a 
private benefit from contributing to a public good in the form of social approval. Social 
sanctions, of approval or disapproval, need not be direct and tangible to encourage 
cooperation. Simply the threat of reprisal, or the suspicion that others dislike a particular 
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behaviour, may constitute a significant social cost for somebody disobeying a social norm. 
Indirect social approval and disapproval are simply forms of intangible social sanctions that 
influence behaviour (Rege & Telle, 2004). Therefore, modifying inappropriate behaviour 
could simply be a response to the threat of negative sanctions, or the expectation of positive 
benefits, instead of direct punishment or reward (Sefton et al., 2007). Additionally, social 
norms can be sustained by internalisation, where a norm becomes so entrenched in a society 
that violating it causes psychological discomfort (Axelrod, 1986). Once enforced by internal 
sanctions, internalisation can manifest itself as feelings of self-satisfaction or guilt (Lindbeck, 
1997). Therefore, cooperative behaviours exhibited in voluntary contribution situations may 
just be an internal affect of the societal pressures to conform, or a response to the coercive 
pressures of society through the action of social norms.  
In order to be successful in adapting behaviour, a social norm needs to be enforced by 
costly punishments, which penalise socially inappropriate behaviour, or reinforced by social 
benefits that encourage acceptable behaviour. From this perspective, ―[s]ocial sanctions 
require offenders to exhibit changes in behaviour in response to the sanction,‖ (Noussair & 
Tucker, 2005). The deterrents employed by individuals to discourage inappropriate behaviour 
vary widely, with dominant strategies involving both formal and informal sanctions (Masclet 
et al., 2003). Informal sanctions such as peer pressure, expressions of disapproval and social 
ostracism have been shown to have significant preventive affects on undesirable behaviours 
(Falk et al., 2005), as have formal sanctions including fines, incarceration and legally 
enforceable restrictions (Noussair & Tucker, 2005). In public goods games, punishment is 
observed even when there are no tangible benefits, and significant personal costs, to the 
punisher (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). The introduction of punishment into an experiment initially 
increases the overall rate of contribution, however, this effect often decays over successive 
trials (Fehr & Gächter 2000). In instances where formal (monetary) sanctions are available 
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for use as punishment for non-contribution, the observation is that individuals will use the 
deterrent even when some personal financial cost is incurred (Fehr & Gächter 2000; Noussair 
& Tucker, 2005). Punishments of this nature cause contributions to increase substantially, 
and similar results are shown for informal sanctions such as shame and social disapproval 
(Masclet et al., 2003). Sefton et al. (2007) extends the research by demonstrating that 
punishment is more successful at encouraging contributions than rewards, in public goods 
experiments. There is also abundant anecdotal evidence that individuals informally sanction 
those who engage in selfish activities at the expense of other group members (Sefton et al., 
2007). 
To enforce a sanction on inappropriate behaviour, the contribution decisions of an 
individual needs to be a matter of public knowledge. In social dilemma experiments, if the 
contribution of an individual is made publicly identifiable, the rate of observed cooperation 
will increase, relative to when the contributions remain anonymous (Croson & Marks, 1998; 
Rege & Telle, 2004). The theory of identifiability creates an environment in which social 
norms can more easily be enforced, allowing social disapproval and approval to influence 
behaviour (Croson & Marks, 1998). This insight is well established in the collection 
processes of charities that publicly list benefactors and their respective contributions (Rege & 
Telle, 2004). Similar anecdotal evidence of this phenomenon has been observed in 
individuals‘ donations to churches and schools.  
In addition to the desire for material benefits, an individual is theorised to hold a 
preference for fairness when considering contributions to public goods (Falk et al., 2000). 
Rabin (1993) introduced the idea that members of a group will reciprocate cooperative 
behaviour, and retaliate against uncooperative behaviour. The theory of fairness dictates that 
if someone is kind to you, then you will be kind in return, or if that person is unkind, you will 
respond with unkindness (Rabin, 1993). In experiments, fairness intentions have been shown 
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to have an effect on both negative and positive reciprocal behaviours, which influence 
contributions to public goods (Falk et al., 2000). 
Closely related to the concept of fairness is the reciprocity motive, which is especially 
evident in small groups of related or associated individuals. An individual conforming to the 
reciprocity motive would contribute to a public good as part of a response to the positive 
actions of others (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). Other individuals within the same community 
may then contribute in return, hoping that all the members in the group develop an ongoing 
agreement to continue contributing. The agreement can be self-sustaining if all individuals 
understand that their withdrawal will cause the withdrawal of others (Croson, 2007). Thus, 
reciprocal interactions are not enforced by a contract, but rather by the hope of continued 
cooperation. Whilst cooperation is fundamentally motivated by the expectation of positive or 
negative reactions, it is important to note that the expectation of future benefits does not 
provoke reciprocity (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). Instead, reciprocity is reinforced by the 
combination of personal benefit to the individual and the (perceived) behavioural intentions 
of others (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). A large body of anecdotal and experimental evidence 
suggests that these arrangements, while imperfect, are often effective. The reciprocity 
mechanism never requires an individual to contribute more than a fellow group member, thus 
removing the problem of ‗unfairness‘ (Sugden, 1984).  
Bernheim (1994) defines a similar principle of interdependent behaviour, conformity. 
The theory posits that an individual holds a propensity for public approval outside of their 
desire to maximise self-gain. The premise implies that individuals receive non-monetary 
utility from cooperative outcomes (Palfrey & Rosenthal, 1987). From this perspective, an 
individual‘s desire for status, and the positive regard of others, can encourage contributions to 
public goods (Bernheim, 1994). If an individual believes that conforming to the social norm 
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will result in social approval, the contribution decisions of the other group members can 
influence the individual‘s behaviour. 
A theory defined by Keser and van Winden (2000) proposes that the majority of 
humans are conditional cooperators, and that punishment may be the primary driving force 
behind sustaining cooperative norms in various social settings. Individuals who contribute to 
a public good are essentially behaving in a conditional manner, in the sense that what they 
contribute depends crucially on what they believe other members of the group will contribute 
(Chaudhuri, 2007). The contribution of a conditional cooperator is positively correlated to the 
beliefs they hold regarding the contributions of the other group members. These individuals 
behave in an intrinsically conditional manner where they use information about the average 
group contribution as a benchmark for their own future contributions (Chaudhuri, 2007). The 
observation of conditional cooperation has been extended to field experiments, with the 
charitable contributions of others exhibiting an influence over an individual‘s donation in 
real-world public goods scenarios (Shang & Croson, 2009). 
It is established that the threat of punishment, or the expectation of reward, are 
significant motivating factors affecting voluntary contribution decisions. Analogous to these 
direct social sanctions is the supposition that beliefs about other‘s behaviour, or others‘ 
beliefs regarding one‘s own behaviour, may affect cooperation. The theory of guilt aversion 
presumes that individuals care about the expectations of others and will experience guilt if 
they believe that their actions fall short of those expectations (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006). 
Furthermore, individuals may be motivated by their beliefs about the beliefs of others 
(Ellingsen et al., 2008). Put simply, guilt can motivate the behaviour of an individual through 
two distinct pathways. Simple guilt manifests when an individual cares about letting others 
down. Alternatively, second-order guilt is based on the inference that an individual is 
concerned with the beliefs that others hold towards them (Battigalli & Dufwenberg, 2007). 
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To summarise, if I believe that you hold an expectation on my behaviour, I am likely to feel 
guilty if my behaviour does not match your expectations. The guilt aversion model attempts 
to assimilate an individual‘s beliefs with their behavioural decisions. The experimental 
analysis of guilt aversion concludes that there is a strong correlation between beliefs and 
behaviour (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006), a result that has been extended to second-order 
beliefs (Ellingsen et al., 2008), both of which influence contributions.  
Following on from the explanatory limitations of altruism, other positive behaviours 
have been introduced into model of voluntary provision. Warm-glow – where the 
reinforcement is the positive emotion gained from the act of giving – and kindness, are 
examples of human motives that rely on ‗giving being its own reward‘. In contribution to 
public goods, warm-glow is the private good produced as a by-product of an individual‘s 
donation (Andreoni, 1990). An experiment by Andreoni reported that on average about half 
of all cooperative moves could be classified as kindness (Andreoni, 1995). This result implies 
that social propensities for kindness and altruism must clearly be very strong and can 
effectively motivate the behaviour of an individual (Andreoni, 1995). A fully satisfactory 
model should, therefore, accommodate the preferences of people who exhibit positive 
feelings from having ‗done their bit‘ (Bergstrom et al., 1985).  
Researchers in the laboratory and field endeavour to capture the tension between 
contributing to a public good and free riding through public goods games and real world 
investigations, in order to understand the factors that influence behaviour (Chaudhuri, 2007). 
Continued attempts to combine the theoretical control and causal propositions of public 
goods games, with the extensive inferences and complex insights of field analyses of 
behavioural-economic theories, have led to constant refinements of the private provision of 
public goods model. Persistence with investigations that combine the disciplines will aid in 
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the prediction of behaviour, and the extension of our knowledge into the intricacies human 
nature. 
 
Voluntary Contribution Field Experiments  
 Public good field experiments offer a unique opportunity to observe the factors that 
influence voluntary contributions to public goods in a natural environment. Previous field 
research into charitable donations has enabled economists to extend, and refine, the theories 
created through the examination of public goods games. An experiment by Shang & Croson 
(2009) into charitable contributions to a public radio station demonstrated the influence of 
social information on individual donations. The researchers manipulated the information 
presented to participants regarding the size of previous contributions. The study reported a 
positive relationship between the contributions of others within the group and the donation of 
an individual. The result was most significant for new donors, for whom the contribution 
situation is the most uncertain (Shang & Croson, 2009). A similar trend was observed when 
downward social information was presented to participants (Shang & Croson, 2008). In this 
experiment, participants were presented information about another donor‘s contribution that 
was either above or below the participant‘s previous contribution. The manipulation altered 
the participant‘s contribution in the direction of social information, showing that it is possible 
to increase or reduce contribution sizes based on the contributions of others (Shang & 
Croson, 2008). The result supports theories of reciprocity, conformity and cooperation, as an 
individual‘s contributions are dependent on their perceptions regarding the contributions of 
others.  
An earlier field experiment presented social information regarding contribution rates 
to the participants with the request for a donation. In this study, the perceived contribution 
rate had a positive effect on the participants‘ donations. The result revealed that the 
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respondents, who were informed that the majority of others in the reference group had 
donated to a charity, increased their contributions, relative to the respondents who were 
informed of a low contribution rate (Frey & Meier, 2004). The authors concluded that the 
participants were conditional cooperators, whether motivated by a desire to conform with the 
social norm, or through a preference for fairness and reciprocity (Frey & Meier, 2004). 
 In addition to the use of social information to elicit donations, research into charitable 
organisations has employed the use of compliance techniques in an attempt to improve 
contribution rates (Weyant, 1996). Field research into donations to non-profit organisations 
has shown that simple social psychology processes can improve the rate of contribution 
(Cialdini, 1988). Numerous theoretical techniques have been forwarded to help improve the 
rate and size of contributions from the public (For a review: Weyant, 1996) with the majority 
involving manipulation of the amount requested, or the arrangement of appeals for 
contributions of different sizes. 
 
Voluntary Donations as an example of a Public Good 
The New Zealand State Education system encompasses the definition of a public good 
as it is non-excludable – all New Zealand citizens between the ages of five and nineteen have 
the right to a free education – and non-rivalrous – one student receiving an education does not 
reduce the availability of an education for others. Therefore, the use of the voluntary 
donations to fund state education creates a field example of a privately provisioned, public 
good. It might be conjectured, however, that the state education system is not a perfect 
example of a public good, as education contains elements of rivalry after a threshold of 
consumption is reached. Whilst school education can be provided at no extra cost for many 
students, each student, above a certain number, may decrease the quality of education 
provided to all students. For example, a single teacher can successfully teach a classroom of 
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twenty-five students without neglecting the learning opportunities for any individual child. 
However, if the number of children increases to thirty-five, the students may not be afforded 
the same opportunities or environment in which to learn. Despite this theoretical limitation, 
the voluntary donation funding system can be considered an impure public good. This is 
common practice in field experiments because ―[F]ew goods are purely public‖ and ―many of 
the implications of [public goods] remain salient even when a good is only partly non-rival or 
partly non-excludable,‖ (Kaul et al., 1999, p. 4). The voluntary donation funding system is 
termed a social dilemma public goods situation because it is a continuous good, and is funded 
from discrete contributions (Croson & Marks, 1998). A continuous public good implies that 
an increase in contributions will increase the amount or quality of the good available (for this 
example: better funded school education from an increase in donations). A public good 
funded by discrete contributions indicates that an individual‘s contribution decision is binary; 
either contribute or not contribute (for this example: an individual either pays the voluntary 
donation or does not) (Croson & Marks, 1998).  
The present research attempted to broaden the existing literature on the private 
provision of public goods by using the voluntary donations as an illustration of a social 
dilemma situation. The investigation will integrate the previously described public goods 
research with the voluntary donation system and assess the validity of the appropriate 
theories on the voluntary contribution motivations of the respondents. 
 
Free Riding in the Voluntary Donation funding system 
A major limitation of the voluntary donation funding system is that the benefits 
received from payment are extremely hard to measure, both in an economic sense and in a 
tangible manner. With no incentive to pay, a proportion of parents choose to free ride by 
refusing to contribute to the voluntary donations. If all parents confronted by the social 
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dilemma of voluntary contribution were motivated purely by self-interest, the expectation 
would be that each parent would choose not to donate, in the hope that all other parents 
would pay the voluntary donation, thus negating any potential loss to their child, and 
minimising their personal costs. Nevertheless, many parents are prepared to pay the voluntary 
donations. In this reality, the focus of the current study is to evaluate the free rider hypothesis 
– those parents who do not pay the voluntary donations – and assess its relevance in the 
current academic climate by applying appropriate public good theories.  
It is from this economic standpoint that the first research question arises. Why do 
parents contribute to the voluntary donations? Do these parents believe that the advantage to 
their children, from having a well-funded learning environment, is enough to warrant paying 
the donation? Is there a private benefit received from contributing? Alternatively, are there 
secondary factors, which coerce (or force) a family to pay the optional contribution? 
Additionally, do parents‘ motivations correspond to the behavioural-economic theories 
presented in the previous section?  
The investigation aimed to answer these questions by analysing and interpreting 
parents‘ attitudes towards the voluntary donation funding system and the related 
environment. The study compared and contrasted two groups of parents of state school 
students: the parents who paid their voluntary donations and the parents who did not pay the 
donations. It was anticipated that the research would work to resolve the contentiousness 
around the voluntary donation funding system by affording schools the ability to understand 
their pupils and families better and ultimately forward possible techniques to increase the 
payment rate.  
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The Social Dilemma of Voluntary Donations 
The voluntary contribution mechanism of the voluntary donation system is a problem 
awaiting sufficient explanation. The general approach in the study of voluntary contributions 
to public goods is to assume that individuals obtain a private benefit from some aspect of 
their own provision, and this encourages contributions beyond that, which would occur if 
benefits came from only the public good itself (Kotchen, 2006). Interpretations of the private 
benefits include a feeling of satisfaction, warm-glow, social approval and prestige. In 
addition, psychologists posit, ―that societies are naturally cooperative through the evolution 
of social norms [and] altruism,‖ (Ledyard, 1995, p. 12). Through investigation of parental 
attitudes towards the various dimensions of the voluntary donations, the current research 
aimed to identify the factors that encourage (or discourage) contributions and discuss their 
relevance in relation to public goods theory. The literature review in the previous section 
identified several behavioural-economic theories, which may influence the voluntary 
donation environment.  
The impact of social norms is regarded as a strong motivational factor when 
considering the voluntary contribution mechanism, as individuals have a preference for social 
approval (Rege & Telle, 2001). In accordance with the theory, social norms are enforced by 
the approval, or disapproval, from others within the group (Coleman, 1990). If the social 
norm of the voluntary donations is to contribute, then individuals can gain social approval, 
and avoid social disapproval, by paying the donation. In the present study, the social norm 
was assessed by asking parents to estimate the donation payment rate at their child‘s school. 
It was hypothesised that payment decision would be positively correlated with a respondent‘s 
estimate of the social norm (i.e. the Paid parents would estimate that the donation payment 
rate was higher than the Not Paid parents). A secondary hypothesis stated that, parents at 
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high decile schools would estimate that the rate of voluntary donation payment was higher, 
compared to parents at low decile schools.  
A theory associated with the existence of social norms is the influence of 
interdependent behaviour. Contributions that are dependent on the behaviour of others 
include observations of reciprocation and conditional cooperation, where the contribution of 
an individual is directly dependent on the contributions of others (in the group). ―Conditional 
co-operators are people who are willing to contribute more to a public good, the more others 
contribute,‖ (Chaudhuri, 2007, p. 7). This conditional response is a form of reciprocity, where 
people will not free ride when others in the group are contributing (Sugden, 1984). From this 
perspective, parents will contribute to the voluntary donations if they believe that the majority 
of other parents at their child‘s school also contribute. If voluntary donation payment is 
believed to be the social norm behaviour, an individual will contribute in order to reciprocate 
the contributions of others or cooperate to reduce unfairness. It was hypothesised that parents 
would anchor their payment decision according to their perception of the contribution rate of 
others. 
Supplementary to the approval and disapproval received from external sources, the 
personal satisfaction gained from a voluntary contribution may be the motivation necessary to 
reinforce contribution behaviour. Internalisation of the social norm may manifest as a feeling 
of satisfaction from payment of the voluntary donation, or a feeling of guilt from non-
payment. Internal satisfaction from having ‗done their bit‘ may be the motivation necessary 
for some parents to pay their donation. Alternatively, the desire to avoid the guilt associated 
with nonconformity might encourage a parent to contribute to the school.  
The existence of external pressures from the school or the community, which coerce 
parents into paying the voluntary donation, has been a source of contention when considering 
the school funding topic. Bill Rudman, an education commentator, proposed the existence of 
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social pressures, positing that the donations are ―simple extortion‖ and verifying that ―schools 
play the guilt card, telling parents their kids will suffer through life [without the voluntary 
donations],‖ (Rudman, 2008, p. 1). Whilst it is against the confidentiality agreement for 
anyone outside of the school‘s administration to know who pays the donation, and who does 
not, it is understood that the information can ‗leak‘ into the wider community in an attempt to 
encourage payments. Reporter and education critic John Minto stated that in some schools the 
―names of paying parents [are] listed in the school newsletter as a way of naming and 
shaming those who haven‘t [paid],‖ (Minto, 2009, p. 1). A study by Croson and Marks (1998, 
p. 172) into voluntary contributions revealed, ―individual and identifiable information [about 
contributions] leads to higher cooperation rates compared to anonymous information‖. 
Identification of the parents who do not pay may motivate the parents to contribute, in order 
to avoid the guilt and social disapproval associated with non-contribution. It was 
hypothesised that the parents who paid the voluntary donations would be more aware of the 
pressures associated with payment identification, because the effectiveness of the potential 
social sanctions would have encouraged their payment. The non-payers, however, would be 
unaware of the pressures associated with identification of payment.  
In the 2008 election debate, current Prime Minister John Key admitted, ―[parents] are 
made to feel embarrassed if they don‘t pay [the voluntary donations].‖ Former Prime Minister 
Helen Clark agreed, acknowledging, ―parents don‘t have to, but are obliged to pay the 
donation,‖ (Key & Clark, 2008). Anecdotal evidence suggests that schools, and their 
communities, especially in higher socio-economic areas, apply pressure to families who 
refuse to pay the voluntary donations, by excluding the parents from meetings and functions 
(Minto, 2009; Personal Communication, 2009). In addition, the children of families who 
refuse to contribute are excluded from extra-curricular activities such as class trips, social 
outings, or camps, and from collecting school diplomas, reports, magazines or yearbooks 
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(Minto, 2009; Personal Communication, 2009; 2010). Further, schools have been known to 
send students home at the start of the year to get unpaid donations for the previous year and 
some schools have resorted to hiring debt collectors to obtain the donations (Woulfe, 2008).  
It was hypothesised that the respondents who paid the voluntary donations would hold 
affirmative attitudes towards the existence of formal pressures in the voluntary donations 
environment. The parents who do not pay the donations, however, would be less aware of the 
sanctions used to encourage payment, and would therefore be unaffected by the pressures to 
pay. A further hypothesis proposed that the presence of pressure would be more pronounced 
in high decile schools, compared to low decile schools. 
Human motives such as warm-glow, altruism and kindness have been forwarded as 
possible solutions to the voluntary contribution problem (Bernheim, 1986). The supposition 
is that an an individual‘s contribution to a public good produces a private good of positive 
internal emotion (Rege, 2004). Motives such as warm-glow and altruism are likely to have an 
effect on the voluntary donation contributions of parents because they provide an incentive to 
donate. The current research predicted that the respondents who contribute to the voluntary 
donations will be more likely to return their questionnaires, compared to those respondents 
who do not pay the donations. As the research bears no direct benefits to those participating, 
return rate will act as an unofficial measure of respondents‘ altruism. 
 
Attitudes and Behaviour 
The proposition that intentions are good predictors of specific behaviours has forced 
researchers to include attitudes in many contemporary theories of human social behaviour. 
From the start of the twentieth century, psychologists have theorised that the determinants of 
behaviour are guided largely by a reasoned action approach, which assumes that the 
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behaviour of an individual follows reasonably from their beliefs, attitudes, and intentions 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). Empirical research into an explanation of human behaviour has 
shown that future behaviour can be successfully predicted from compatible measures of 
attitudes towards the behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). These 
attitudes are seen as unique mental processes, which determine an individual‘s actual 
responses to behavioural decisions.  
Ajzen and Fishbein presented major contributions to the literature on the way attitudes 
affect behaviour for more than of three decades (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 
2005). Their first major contribution was the conception of the Theory of Reasoned Action, 
which was forwarded as an attempt to explain the factors that motivate volitional behaviour 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). The theory of reasoned action encompasses three factors that are 
theorised to cumulatively predict future behavioural decisions: behavioural intentions, 
attitudes and subjective norms (Hale et al., 2002). According to the theory, behavioural intent 
– the combination of one‘s attitude toward performing the behaviour, and the social norm 
associated with that behaviour – is the most important determinant of the behaviour of an 
individual.  A social norm (similar to the economic definition) aids in the motivation of 
action by reinforcing those behaviours that are viewed as receiving approval from significant 
others in society, and by reducing the desire to perform acts that will gain disapproval 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). The intention to behave in a certain way depends upon the product 
of the measures of attitudes and the social norm of the behaviour. A positive product 
indicates positive behavioural intent, and a negative product shows negative behavioural 
intent (Trafimow, 2009). 
One of the greatest limitations of this theory was that it overlooked the ability, or 
volition, an individual has when executing actions in a prospective situation (Hale et al., 
2002). This element is the concept of perceived behavioural control, and regards an 
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individual‘s perception of their ability to carry out an action when they have incomplete 
volitional control (Ajzen, 1991). The addition of this factor resulted in an extension of the 
theory, known as the Theory of Planned Behaviour. According to the theory of planned 
behaviour, perceived behavioural control, together with behavioural intent, can be used to 
directly predict future behavioural action (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). Empirical results 
displayed in a review of the theory (Ajzen, 1991) illustrate that the attitudes towards 
performing an action, when combined with the social norms and perceived behavioural 
control, successfully predict intentions to perform the behaviour and account for considerable 
variance in actual, observed behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005). This theory confirms that 
the measurement of attitudes is a successful criterion for the discrimination and prediction of 
behavioural decisions. The current research incorporated the theory of planned behaviour, by 
constructing a survey that measured respondents‘ attitudes towards a range of positive and 
negative statements concerning the voluntary donation funding environment in order to 
predict the payment behaviour of the respondents.  
 
Scale Hypotheses 
Whilst this research was essentially exploratory, it was hypothesised that there would 
be a marked difference in respondents‘ attitudes towards the voluntary donations, the views 
on their child‘s current school and appraisal of the current New Zealand Government, 
between voluntary donation contributors and non-contributors. A survey questionnaire was 
employed to measure parental attitudes towards these factors in an attempt to predict the 
payment decision of the respondents. The crux of the research aimed to create three attitude 
scales within the framework of the voluntary donation funding system. The first of the three 
hypothesised scales was a construct that aimed to measure respondents‘ attitudes towards the 
voluntary donations and factors related directly to the payment system. The purpose of the 
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scale was to develop a measure of the factors that may affect payment decision. These factors 
include: comprehension – the information regarding the donations is clear and concise; – 
human motives – the positive and negative feelings gained from contribution or non-
contribution; – external pressures – whether the sanctions imposed by the school or 
community affect payment decision; – and financial – whether the donation places financial 
pressure on the respondent. The researcher hypothesised that respondents‘ attitudes towards 
the voluntary donation funding system would correlate positively with payment decision. 
The second scale was designed to measure respondents‘ attitudes towards the school 
their child currently attends. One of the original theories on payment motivation was that a 
parent‘s view of their child‘s teacher, principal and the overall learning environment of the 
school would influence voluntary contributions. The scale included seven questionnaire 
items. The third, hypothesised construct was designed to allow respondents‘ an opportunity to 
appraise the government with respect to the education system. This selection of statements 
assessed respondents‘ views on the current New Zealand Government, the Prime Minister 
and the Ministry of Education. This scale included eight questionnaire items. The hypotheses 
stated that payment decision would have a positive correlation with respondents‘ views 
towards the school and the Government.  
The researcher hypothesised that the two groups – the Paid and the Not Paid 
respondents – would naturally differ in their demographic constitution. Intuitive observations 
proposed that the respondents‘ annual household income, educational achievement and age 
would be positively related to payment decision (i.e. contributors would be older, more 
educated and earn a higher annual income than non-contributors). In contrast, no differences 
were expected between the groups on the dimensions of gender, ethnicity, family size or the 
amount of time the children have left at their current school.  
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METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
 The researcher selected twenty schools from the Christchurch City district for 
inclusion in the study. The fundamental selection criterion was school decile rating with 
consideration given to roll size, community composition and geographic position. The 
schools were instructed to randomly select a sample of the parents of their students to 
participate in the study, based on the condition of voluntary donation payment decision. Each 
school randomly selected forty parents, twenty from each of the two conditions (Paid the 
voluntary donation versus Not Paid the voluntary donation), for an overall sample of 800 
participants. An analysis of the respondents‘ demographic characteristics is included in the 
Sample section. For a detailed description of the collection process used to select participants 
and schools, see the Procedure section.  
 
Decile Rating Index 
 The New Zealand decile rating system aims to assure equality of educational 
outcomes across all socio-economic groups (Ministry of Education, 2005). The decile rating 
system was developed by the Ministry of Education to allocate targeted funding based on the 
socio-economic characteristics of a school. A school is assigned a decile rating based on the 
socio-economic composition of the catchment area of the school, categorised according to the 
data received from the most recent New Zealand census. The decile rating system takes into 
account household income, employment status, educational achievement, income support and 
household size, and uses ten subdivisions, each containing ten percent of schools (Ministry of 
Education, 2008). A school‘s decile indicates the extent to which the school draws its 
students from low socio-economic communities. Decile one schools are the ten percent of 
schools with the highest proportion of students from low socio-economic communities, 
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whereas decile ten schools are the ten percent of schools with the lowest proportion of low 
socio-economic students (Ministry of Education, 2009). A school‘s decile does not indicate 
the overall socio-economic mix of the school, but represents the community in which the 
families of the pupils reside.  In its early stages, the scale made use of the original Elley-
Irving Index (1972). The decile rating index is extensively used for selecting school samples, 
and for analysing results of regional and national surveys of achievement. Thus, the National 
Educational Monitoring Project (NEMP) surveys of achievement consistently show marked 
differences in performance levels between schools of different decile levels (Crooks & 
Flockton, 2002).  
 
Questionnaire 
 Participants completed a questionnaire survey made up of thirty-seven statements 
separated into three scales and a section of demographic information. The first scale, items 
1.1 – 1.7, was designed to assess the participants‘ political attitudes and their opinions on the 
current New Zealand Government. The second scale, items 2.1 – 2.8, focuses on the school 
currently attended by the child (or children) of the respondent. In the situation where a 
respondent had children at more than one state school, the participant was instructed to 
consider their responses, concerning the school that their youngest school aged child attends. 
The third scale, items 3.1 – 3.14, aimed to measure respondents‘ attitudes towards the 
voluntary donation funding system. The final section, items 4.1 – 4.8, collected demographic 
information from the respondents on a variety of dimensions. To differentiate between the 
two conditions the Paid questionnaires were printed on Blue paper and the Not Paid 
questionnaires printed on Yellow paper. 
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Measures 
 The respondents were ‗naturally‘ assigned to one of the two experimental conditions 
based on their voluntary donation payment decision. The research used a unique survey 
questionnaire for each of the two conditions. The survey questionnaires are attached as 
Appendix A (Paid) and B (Not Paid). The questionnaires from both conditions consisted of: 
(a) an information sheet informing respondents of the research aims, instructions and 
confidentiality agreement; (b) statements measuring respondents‘ attitudes to the current New 
Zealand Government and education system; (c) statements assessing respondents‘ attitudes 
towards their child‘s current school; (d) statements regarding respondents‘ attitudes towards 
the voluntary donations funding system; and, (e) demographic information. Version 1 (Paid) 
was completed by those parents who paid the voluntary donation and Version 2 (Not Paid) 
completed by those parents who did not pay the voluntary donation. The two versions of the 
questionnaire contained a different question in Section D, with Item 3.12 modified for each 
variation. Payment decision was coded with 1 = Paid and 0 = Not Paid.  
 Listed below are the actual questions, each under the appropriate heading: 
 
Political and current New Zealand Government Appraisal scale (Items 1.1 – 1.7) 
The statements in this section aimed to gauge respondents‘ attitudes towards the 
Government and education system. Respondents indicated their attitudes towards the current 
New Zealand Government, current Prime Minister, the education system and their view on 
the Ministry of Education.  
Respondents were asked to consider the following seven statements:  
a. The current Government is competent 
b. The current Prime Minister is doing his job well 
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c. The educational policies of a political party are important when I decide who to vote 
for 
d. Free education is a right that all New Zealanders deserve     
e. Education should be compulsory for all children in New Zealand 
f. The Ministry of Education organises the education system in New Zealand 
successfully 
g. Overall the education system in New Zealand is well administered   
Each item was scored on a seven-point Likert-type rating scale, anchored at 1 = ‗Strongly 
disagree‘ and 7 = ‗Strongly agree‘ with a midpoint of 4 = ‗neither agree nor disagree‘. 
 
Views on the current School scale (Items 2.1 – 2.8) 
The statements in this section were designed to assess the respondents‘ perceptions of, 
and attitudes towards, their child‘s current school. The items explore the views of the school 
by seeking responses to positive and negative statements on varying school dimensions.  
Respondents were asked to consider the following eight items:  
a. The school is well organised 
b. The teachers are competent and passionate 
c. The administration of the school is well governed and managed 
d. I have contemplated withdrawing my child from the school 
e. The school operates effectively with the funding it receives     
f. The school has the right to request money from families to supplement  
government funding      
g. In general the school has a successful learning environment    
h. I understand the school decile rating system and how it affects government funding to 
schools  
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Each item was scored on a seven-point Likert-type rating scale, anchored at 1 = ‗Strongly 
disagree‘ and 7 = ‗Strongly agree‘ with a midpoint of 4 = ‗neither agree nor disagree‘. 
 
Attitudes towards the Voluntary Donation Funding System scale (Items 3.1 – 3.14) 
The third section was the longest and most innovative element of the current research. 
The scale was designed to measure the respondents‘ attitudes towards the voluntary donations 
that their child‘s current school requested. The statements examined the respondents‘ 
comprehension of the voluntary donations, their views on the existence of pressures and 
sanctions associated with their payment decision, and their overall perception of the 
voluntary donation funding system. 
Respondents were asked to consider the following fourteen items:  
a. Sufficient information is supplied by my child‘s school about the Voluntary 
Donations 
b. I understand what the Voluntary Donations are used for  
c. I understand from the information provided that the Donations are completely 
optional 
d. I would rather participate in  fundraising ventures for the school than pay the 
Voluntary Donations 
e. The Voluntary Donations are necessary for the successful operation of my child‘s 
school  
f. I am aware that a tax exemption is available on the money I pay as a Voluntary 
Donations   
g. Even though the Donations are anonymous I feel my payment decision could impact 
on my child       
h. It is difficult for me to find the money to pay the Voluntary Donations   
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i. External pressures (e.g. from the school or other parents etc.) impacted on my 
Voluntary Donation payment decision  
j. The school administration‘s awareness of who pays the Voluntary Donations impacts 
on my payment decision   
k. I feel pressured to pay the Voluntary Donation by the number of invoices or 
reminders sent out by the school    
l. I enjoy the feeling of satisfaction I get when I pay the Voluntary Donations (Paid)  
or  
I find it easy to forget about paying the Voluntary Donation  (Not Paid) 
m. I am made to feel guilty if I don‘t pay the Voluntary Donation 
n. The school withholds extra-curricular activities (e.g. Camps or Trips) from my child if 
I don‘t pay the Donation  
Each item was scored on a seven-point Likert-type rating scale, anchored at 1 = ‗Strongly 
disagree‘ and 7 = ‗Strongly agree‘ with a midpoint of 4 = ‗neither agree nor disagree‘. 
 
Demographic Information of the Respondents (Items 4.1 – 4.8) 
The first item in the demographic information section asked respondents to estimate 
the proportion of parents who paid the donation, at their child‘s current school (Item 4.1). The 
answers were entered by circling one of five possibilities, which was coded: 1 = 20% or less, 
2 = 21 – 40%, 3 = 41 – 60%, 4 = 61 – 80% and 5 = 81 – 100%.  
The remainder of the questions in this section aimed to collect demographic 
information and investigate the influence that static socio-economic variables have on 
voluntary donation payment decision. Respondents indicated their gender, age, ethnicity, 
annual household income and highest educational qualification. They were also asked to 
identify the number of children they financially supported and the number of years their 
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children had remaining at their current school. The responses to the questions concerning the 
number of children financially supported and years remaining at the current school (Items 4.2 
and 4.3, respectively) were entered by circling the corresponding number: 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 or 
more (5 or more was coded as a 5 in the analysis). Gender (Item 4.4) was coded: 1 = Female, 
2 = Male and 3 = Both Male and Female respondents. Age group (Item 4.5) was coded: 1 = 
20 – 28 years, 2 = 29 – 37 years, 3 = 38 – 46 years, 4 = 47 – 55 years, 5 = 56 – 64 years and 6 
= 65 years or over. Ethnicity (Item 4.6) was coded: 1 = NZ European, 2 = Māori, 3 = Pacific 
Islander, 4 = Asian and 5 = Other (particulars not specified) with respondents instructed that 
they could identify more than one ethnic group if necessary. The respondents who answered 
with a combined ethnicity were coded: 6 = NZ & Māori, 7 = NZ & Pacific Islander, 8 = NZ 
& Other and 9 = NZ, Māori & one other ethnicity. Annual household income after tax (Item 
4.7) had eight response categories, with answers coded: 1 = 20,000 or under, 2 = 20,001 – 
35,000, 3 = 35,001 – 50,000, 4 = 50,001 – 65,000, 5 = 65,001 – 80,000, 6 = 80,001 – 95,000, 
7 = 95,001 – 110,000 and 8 = 110,001 or over. The respondents‘ highest educational 
qualification (Item 4.8) responses were coded: 1 = No formal qualification, 2 = High School 
Qualification, 3 = Tertiary Diploma/Certificate, 4 = Under-Graduate Degree and 5 = Post-
Graduate Qualification. A combination of two categories was coded as the higher of the two 
categories (e.g. No Qualification and High School Qualification was coded: 2 = High 
School). School decile rating was recorded using a colour-coded mark on each questionnaire 
prior to delivery to the designated school.  
The following eight items made up the demographic scale: 
a. What percentage of parents, at the school your child attends, do you believe pay the 
Voluntary Donation? 
b.  How many children, under the age of 18, do you financially support? 
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c. How many years do you expect your youngest child to continue attending their 
current school including this year? 
d. What is your gender? 
e. What age group do you belong to? 
f. What Ethnic group do you identify with (you may select more than one)? 
g. What is your annual household income (combination of you and your partner after 
tax)? 
h. What is the highest level of educational qualification you have achieved? 
 
Procedure 
Ethics approval was obtained from the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee prior to the collection of any data (Attached Appendix C). 
The twenty schools used in the research were selected from the primary, intermediate 
and secondary school domains. Of the twenty schools, fourteen were primary schools, three 
were intermediate schools and three were secondary schools. Two of the three secondary 
schools were male only facilities, whereas all of the other eighteen schools were co-
educational. The selection of schools was random, but was mediated by the willingness of the 
school to participate in the research. It is estimated that about one hundred schools were 
initially contacted by telephone, with the researcher meeting with twenty-six schools until the 
target of twenty had been achieved. Each decile was represented by two schools (except for 
decile seven – one school – due to the lack of availability in the Christchurch area, and decile 
six – three schools – to replace the missing decile seven). In order to preserve the privacy and 
confidentiality of the participants, and the schools, used in this research, neither party will be 
named.  
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The initial contact with the schools was by telephone. If the school administration was 
interested in the research, an introductory meeting was held with the principal at the school 
(and in some cases, other interested parties as organised by the school) to discuss the 
research. The principals were offered the opportunity to raise concerns, or recommend 
improvements, about the questionnaire at this initial meeting. In many instances, the principal 
conferred with the Board of Trustees, Parent Teacher Association or other concerned parties 
to discuss participation in the study. The twenty schools each received forty ‗Questionnaire 
Envelopes‘, twenty for the Paid condition and twenty for the Not Paid condition, which they 
delivered to the participants by mail. The researcher decided to use mail delivery because it 
allowed information to be acquired from a large sample, gave respondents time to consider 
their responses, removed interviewer bias and preserved the anonymity of the respondents 
(Greer et. al, 2000). The envelopes included a questionnaire (dependent on condition), an 
information sheet for the respondents to keep, a self-addressed return envelope and a one-
dollar Scratch „n‟ Win ticket. The parental information sheet is attached as Appendix D.  
Before administering the questionnaire to the participants, the survey was piloted 
through a selection of current teachers, principals and parents, who were asked to identify any 
problems with the questionnaire, or any extensions, which they believed would benefit the 
research. Revisions were made based on their suggestions.  
The twenty schools received an information sheet notifying the administration of the 
confidentiality agreement between the researcher and the school, and distribution 
instructions, for their own records (attached Appendix E). The school administrations were 
instructed to address and mail the postage-paid envelopes containing the Blue questionnaires 
to twenty families whom had already paid the voluntary donation, and the envelopes 
containing the Yellow questionnaires to twenty families whom had not paid the voluntary 
donations. 
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Schools vary greatly in the collection policy used for the voluntary donations. Whilst 
many schools choose to afford parents the option of lump-sum payment or quarterly term-
payments, others prefer to break payments up into more affordable monthly or weekly 
payments. A number of schools allow parents to pay the whole amount (or a final instalment) 
at the end of the school year. The difference in collection procedures and the variance in date 
of payment, made it very difficult to identify those families who would not pay the voluntary 
donations. The researcher, therefore, instructed schools to deliver the Not Paid questionnaires 
to those parents who had not paid the voluntary donations (at that time) and, who historically 
(in previous years at the school) did not pay the donation.  
The number of questionnaires delivered totalled eight hundred – four hundred from 
each of the two conditions – between the twenty schools. Schools were directed to select a 
random sample of parents for each of the conditions, however, selection process was at the 
discretion of the school, as it would have violated the terms of the ethics agreement, for the 
researcher to interfere with sampling. The researcher did not have any contact with the 
participants during the research. All twenty schools reported that they had mailed the 
questionnaires to the agreed number of parents. 
The questionnaires were mailed by the school‘s administrations to the respondents no 
later than the 11
th
 of June 2010. Collection of the returned questionnaires ceased on the 13
th
 
of August 2010. It was presumed that two months presented sufficient opportunity for the 
majority of potential respondents to complete and return the questionnaires. The 
questionnaires were self-administered and the respondents returned the completed survey by 
mail to the Psychology Department at the University of Canterbury.  
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Sample 
Two hundred and fifty questionnaires of the eight hundred delivered were collected; a 
return rate of 31.25%. Of those two hundred and fifty respondents, five were omitted from 
the data analysis. Participants # 49, # 50, # 51 and # 185 were excluded from the final data 
analysis because they failed to complete the first page of the questionnaire (missed 19% of 
the survey questions). Participant # 228 was excluded because they failed to complete the 
demographic section of the questionnaire (missed 22% of the survey questions).  
Table 1 summarises the respondents‘ demographic characteristics including gender, 
age, ethnicity, number of children financially supported, years their child has left at the 
school they currently attend, educational achievement and annual income. It should be noted 
that not all participants responded to all of the demographic questions. 
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Table 1.
Demographic Classification of Respondents.
Gender Paid Not Paid Total
Female 132 63 195
Male 27 21 48
Both 1 1 2
Age Group (years)
20 – 28 1 4 5
29 – 37 28 31 59
38 – 46 107 38 145
47 – 55 24 11 35
56 – 64 0 1 1
Ethnicity
New Zealand European 128 53 181
Māori 7 10 17
Pacific Islander 5 8 13
Asian 1 0 1
Other 9 3 12
NZ & Pacific Islander 4 10 14
NZ & Māori 3 0 3
NZ, Māori & Other 2 0 2
NZ & Other 1 1 2
Annual Household Income ($)
< 20,000 8 8 16
20,001 – 35,000 8 24 32
35,001 – 50,000 29 17 46
50,001 – 65,000 21 14 35
65,001 – 80,000 34 4 38
80,001 – 95,000 20 1 21
95,001 – 110,000 18 8 26
> 110,001 19 6 25
Number of Children Financially Supported
1 25 18 43
2 88 25 113
3 30 31 61
4 12 8 20
> 5 5 2 7
Highest form of Educational Achievement
No Formal Qualification 12 19 31
High School Qualification 53 26 79
Tertiary Diploma/Certificate 49 28 77
Under-Graduate Degree 24 5 29
Post-Graduate Qualification 22 7 29
Years child has left at Current School
1 23 11 34
2 23 16 39
3 26 13 39
4 16 10 26
> 5 72 35 107
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RESULTS 
Data Transformations 
 The researcher created six additional variables for use in the univariate and multivariate 
exploratory analyses included later in this section. Four of these were reverse coded survey items: 
2.4 I have contemplated withdrawing my child from the school, 2.6 The school has the right to 
request money from families to supplement government funding, 3.1 Sufficient information is 
supplied by my child‟s school about the Voluntary Donations and 3.5 The Voluntary Donations 
are necessary for the successful operation of my child‟s school.  
 The other two variables were modifications of selected demographic variables. School 
decile rating was separated into Low Decile (coded as 1) and High Decile (coded as 2), with the 
two groups populated by those respondents from deciles 1 – 5 and deciles 6 – 10, respectively. 
This variable was named High vs. Low Decile rating. The last additional variable employed a 
median-split of respondent‘s annual household income. An income of $65,000 or less was defined 
as Low Income (coded as 0) and an income of $65,001 or more was termed High Income (coded as 
1). This variable was named High vs. Low Income. 
 
Research Design 
The researcher evaluated inferential statistics in the following section against an alpha 
level of .05, unless otherwise stated. 
The following analytic investigation aimed to examine respondents‘ attitudes towards 
the voluntary donation funding system, the school their child currently attends, and the 
current Government, by evaluating their responses to a range of positive and negative 
statements. The analyses first outlined the respondents‘ attitudes to each of the statements and 
then examined the differences between the two payment decision conditions. The research 
employed a between-groups, quasi-experimental design with the respondents ‗naturally‘ 
separated on levels of payment decision (two groups). The group of respondents who paid 
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their voluntary donation were referred to as the Paid condition, and the respondents that did 
not pay their donation were named the Not Paid condition. 
 
Return Rate for Questionnaire Surveys 
Of the 245 valid returns, 160 (65% of total returns) were from the Paid condition and 
the remaining 85 (35% of total returns) were from the Not Paid condition. The return rate of 
the two groups was significantly different, as illustrated by the z-ratio for difference between 
two independent proportions, z = 5.75, p < .001. The return rates, as a proportion of the total 
questionnaires delivered per condition, were 40% for the Paid condition and 21% for the Not 
Paid condition, for an overall return rate of 31%. This result was observed as an informal 
measure of parental support for the current study into the voluntary donation funding system, 
with a reasonable respondent return rate highlighting the contentiousness of the issue. 
 
Decile Breakdown 
A similar set of analyses were conducted for return rates as a function of school decile 
rating. The breakdown of questionnaire returns by school decile rating is shown in Table 2. 
As mentioned in the Methodology, three schools represented decile six, and one school 
represented decile seven. To adjust for the differences in sample size, the quantity of returns 
was multiplied by two-thirds for decile six, and by two for decile seven. After transformation, 
decile six had 26.67 returns and decile seven had 26 returns. A Chi-square test found that the 
return rates of the payment decision groups were not significantly different when separated 
by High vs. Low Decile rating, χ² (1) = 1.63, p = .2012. This result demonstrated an even 
distribution of returns by school decile rating. The t-test for independent means, which 
measured whether school decile rating differed for those who paid the donations and those 
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who did not pay (Paid M = 5.89, Sd = 2.70; Not Paid M = 5.29, Sd = 3.07), was also non-
significant, t(243) = 1.56, p > .12. The analysis showed that the socio-economic status of the 
school was unrelated to payment of the voluntary donations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. 
Questionnaire Return Rate by Decile
Paid Not Paid Total Of total returns Of total delivered
6 13 19 7.76% 23.75%
10 6 16 6.53% 20.00%
24 11 35 14.29% 43.75%
15 7 22 8.98% 27.50%
16 8 24 9.80% 30.00%
29 11 40 16.33% 33.33% *
10 3 13 5.31% 32.50% *
15 9 24 9.80% 30.00%
10 5 15 6.12% 18.75%
25 12 37 15.10% 46.25%
160 85 245 100% —
* Proportion adjusted for differences in sample size.
Number Returned Percentage Returns
Totals
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Decile Rating
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EXPLANATION OF RESULTS 
Questionnaire Items 
A series of t-tests for independent means were performed to examine the relationship 
between payment decision and attitudes towards the individual questionnaire items. The 
explanations of the results for the t-tests are included in the appropriate sections. 
To improve the understanding of the factors that influence payment decision, a series 
of single sample t-tests were also conducted for all questionnaire items (for both groups). 
These tests analysed the difference between the mean response for each item and the neutral 
response, to observe if the respondents‘ attitude towards the statement was significantly 
different to ―neither agree nor disagree‖. A vast majority of the statements were significant 
for the single sample t-test showing that respondents held clear attitudes towards these 
statements.  
A general comparison of the groups revealed a substantial effect of payment decision 
on the attitudes of the respondents. The parents who Paid the voluntary donations held 
significantly more positive attitudes towards the current Government, and the voluntary 
donation funding system, than the Not Paid respondents. Both the Paid and Not Paid 
respondents held positive views of the school their child currently attends. 
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„Political/Government Appraisal‟ Individual Survey Items 
In general, the results of the t-tests for independent means suggest that the parents 
who Paid the voluntary donations held a more positive view of the Government, compared to 
the Not Paid respondents. The Paid respondents exhibited positive attitudes towards the 
current Government, current Prime Minister, the education system in New Zealand, and the 
Ministry of Education, whereas the Not Paid respondents held neutral views towards these 
political factors. Both groups believed that education should be compulsory for all children, 
and that free education is a right that all New Zealanders deserve. Refer to Table 3 for the 
descriptive statistics, and t-tests for independent means and single samples, for the political 
appraisal survey items. 
 
Table 3.
Political/Government Appraisal Scale Survey Items - Means, Standard Deviations and t-tests
Mean Sd Mean Sd t -value p
The current Government is competent 4.43 *** -1.53 3.72 -1.57 3.42 0.001
The current Prime Minister is doing his job well 4.73 *** -1.62 4.08 -1.61 2.99 0.003
The educational policies of a political party are important 
when I decide who to vote for
5.54 *** -1.25 5.42 *** -1.31 0.67 0.505
Free education is a right that all New Zealanders deserve 6.48 *** -1.01 6.72 *** -0.81 -1.86 0.064
Education should be compulsory for all children in New 
Zealand
6.83 *** -0.57 6.85 *** -0.72 -0.26 0.792
The Ministry of Education organises the education system in 
New Zealand successfully
4.43 *** -1.36 4.15 -1.07 1.63 0.104
Overall the education system in New Zealand is well 
administered
4.51 *** -1.27 4.13 -1.18 2.26 0.025
Note: Items measured on scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) with neutral point of 4 (Neither Agree nor Disagree).
The single sample t -test results are significant if the mean reponse is statistically different to the neutral midpoint of the scale.
*** Denotes that attitude is significantly different to the neutral midpoint (4) at p < .001
Paid (N = 160) Not Paid (N = 85) T -tests
Questionnaire Items
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„Views on the current School‟ Individual Survey Items 
Generally, both groups of respondents held a positive view of the school their child 
currently attends. The two groups exhibited similar attitudes towards the teachers, principal, 
administration, and the learning environment of the school. Few parents from either group 
had contemplated withdrawing their child from the school, and the majority believed that the 
school operated effectively with the funding it received. Overall, the respondents from both 
groups held similarly affirmative views on all the factors associated with the school. Refer to 
Table 4 for the descriptive statistics, and t-tests for independent means and single samples, 
for the views on the current school survey items. 
 
Table 4.
Views on the current School Scale Survey Items - Means, Standard Deviations and t-tests
Mean Sd Mean Sd t -value p
The school is well organised 5.69 *** -1.26 5.79 *** -1.26 -0.56 0.577
The teachers are competent and passionate 5.72 *** -1.21 5.71 *** -1.15 0.08 0.936
The administration of the school is well governed and 
managed
5.66 *** -1.24 5.75 *** -1.29 -0.57 0.567
I have contemplated withdrawing my child from the school 
(R) 6.02 *** -1.76 5.94 *** -1.83 0.32 0.746
The school operates effectively with the funding it receives 5.17 *** -1.41 5.11 *** -1.50 0.34 0.738
In general the school has a successful learning environment 5.79 *** -1.11 5.72 *** -1.15 0.51 0.613
I understand the school decile rating system and how it 
affects government funding to schools 
5.36 *** -1.59 5.20 *** -1.89 0.67 0.503
Note: Items measured on scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) with neutral point of 4 (Neither Agree nor Disagree).
The single sample t -test results are significant if the mean reponse is statistically different to the neutral midpoint of the scale.
*** Denotes that attitude is significantly different to the neutral midpoint (4) at p < .001
(R)
 denotes reverse scored items.
Questionnaire Items
Paid (N = 160) Not Paid (N = 85) T -tests
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„Attitudes towards the Voluntary Donations‟ Individual Survey Items 
The statements in this section aimed to measure the respondents‘ attitudes, 
motivations and comprehension towards the voluntary donation funding system (See Table 5 
for the t-tests and descriptive statistics).  
In general, the Paid respondents held significantly more positive attitudes towards the 
voluntary donations, and viewed them as more necessary for the successful operation of the 
school. The Paid parents were also were more inclined to agree that requesting a donation 
was within the rights of the school, and more likely to be aware of the availability of a tax 
exemption on the money paid as a donation. The parents in the Not Paid condition were more 
motivated to assist the school with fundraising ventures instead of paying the voluntary 
donation and found paying the donations more financially difficult.  
The statements that measured perceptions of the pressures on contributions, divided 
the respondents. Firstly, the Paid respondents held firm beliefs that external pressures (from 
the school or other parents) did not affect their payment decision. The Not Paid respondents, 
however, were more circumspect on the existence of external pressure in regards to their 
voluntary donations. The Not Paid respondents perceived that the schools‘ awareness of 
payment decision caused substantial pressure on payment of the donations, and felt more 
pressure to pay due to the invoices and reminders sent by the school, than the Paid 
respondents. In addition, the non-payers reported being made to feel guilty if they did not pay 
the donations. These results suggest that the threat of reprisal from the school or community 
affected the non-payers‘ payments more than the payers. 
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Table 5.
Attitude towards the Voluntary Donations Scale Survey Items - Means, Standard Deviations and t-tests
Mean Sd Mean Sd t -value p
The school has the right to request money from families to 
supplement government funding 
(R) 4.69 *** -1.81 3.56 * -1.89 4.54 0.000
Sufficient information is supplied by my child‘s school about 
the Voluntary Donations 
(R) 4.67 *** -1.61 4.37 -1.78 1.33 0.184
I understand what the Voluntary Donations are used for 4.60 *** -1.78 4.59 ** -1.86 0.05 0.957
I understand from the information provided that the 
Donations are completely optional
5.41 *** -1.79 5.04 *** -1.89 1.51 0.134
I would rather participate in fundraising ventures for the 
school than pay the Voluntary Donations
2.43 *** -1.48 4.36 -2.12 -8.28 0.000
The Voluntary Donations are necessary for the successful 
operation of my child‘s school 
(R) 5.81 *** -1.32 4.63 ** -1.92 5.62 0.000
I am aware that a tax exemption is available on the money I 
pay as a Voluntary Donations 
5.52 *** -2.04 4.80 ** -2.21 2.55 0.012
Even though the Donations are anonymous I feel my 
payment decision could impact on my child 
4.31 -2.12 4.80 *** -1.90 -1.78 0.077
It is difficult for me to find the money to pay the Voluntary 
Donations
3.10 *** -2.04 4.82 *** -2.15 -6.18 0.000
External pressures (e.g. from the school or other parents 
etc.) impacted on my Voluntary Donation payment decision
2.66 *** -2.04 3.55 * -2.07 -3.20 0.002
The school administration‘s awareness of who pays the 
Voluntary Donations impacts on my payment decision
3.33 *** -2.26 4.06 -2.17 -2.43 0.016
I feel pressured to pay the Voluntary Donation by the 
number of invoices or reminders sent out by the school
3.39 ** -2.33 4.71 ** -2.34 -4.22 0.000
I am made to feel guilty if I don‘t pay the Voluntary 
Donation
3.25 *** -2.00 3.92 -2.22 -2.35 0.019
The school withholds extra-curricular activities (e.g. Camps 
or Trips) from my child if I don‘t pay the Donation 
2.62 *** -1.85 2.64 *** -1.99 -0.07 0.943
I enjoy the feeling of satisfaction I get when I pay the 
Voluntary Donations 
4.71 *** -1.83 — —
I find it easy to forget about paying the Voluntary Donation 3.71 -2.31 — —
Note: Items measured on scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) with neutral point of 4 (Neither Agree nor Disagree).
The single sample t -test results are significant if the mean reponse is statistically different to the neutral midpoint of the scale.
* Denotes that attitude is significantly different to the neutral midpoint (4) at p < .05
** Denotes that attitude is significantly different to the neutral midpoint (4) at p < .01
*** Denotes that attitude is significantly different to the neutral midpoint (4) at p < .001
(R)
 denotes reverse scored items.
Questionnaire Items
Paid (N = 160) Not Paid (N = 85) T -tests
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Whilst differences between the two groups allowed for the identification of factors 
that may influence payment decision, it is often just as interesting to examine the variables 
that seemingly have no effect on the contributions of the parents (items with non-significant 
group differences). 
The majority of respondents exhibited a moderate understanding of the overall 
voluntary donation funding system. Both groups of respondents revealed similar attitudes 
regarding their understanding of the school decile rating system, and the overall information 
provided by the school. The respondents from both conditions also exhibited similar 
understanding of what the donations were used for, and that the donations were optional. It is 
noteworthy, however, that the respondents‘ comprehension of the voluntary donations was 
only slightly positive. The results revealed that the respondents‘ attitudes towards the overall 
level of information provided by the school, regarding the voluntary donations, were 
marginally adequate.  
Null results were observed for two of the statements that measured attitudes toward 
the pressures on payment of the donation. Both groups of respondents held similarly neutral 
views on whether their payment decision impacted on their child. In addition, neither group 
believed that the school withheld activities from their child because of non-payment. The 
results suggest that the majority of parents did not perceive any retaliatory actions from the 
school because of voluntary donation non-payment, either through the exclusion of pupils 
from extra-curricular activities, or the use of formal sanctions.  
 
Effect of School Decile Rating 
The respondents‘ attitudes towards the pressures associated with voluntary donation 
payment were more pronounced in high decile schools, than in low decile schools. Few 
respondents with children at low decile schools perceived pressure on their payment decision, 
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showing that external pressures and sanctions had little effect on their voluntary donation 
payments. In contrast, significant differences between the Paid and Not Paid respondents 
were revealed in the group comparisons of the high decile schools (See Table 6 for the t-tests 
for independent means). The results identified that the Not Paid respondents, at high decile 
schools, perceived that the community and other parents imposed pressures and informal 
sanctions to encourage payment of the voluntary donations. The non-payers felt that their 
child was affected by their payment decision, and that the school used reminders and invoices 
to pressure their payment of the donation. In addition, the non-payers experienced more guilt 
because of their contribution decision, than the payers. The Paid parents exhibited neutral 
attitudes towards the perceived use of pressure to encourage the payment of voluntary 
donations. 
 
Table 6.
Pressures and Sanctions Survey Items - Means, Standard Deviations and t-tests for High Decile Schools (6 - 10)
Mean SD Mean SD t -value p
The Voluntary Donations are necessary for the successful 
operation of my child‘s school ***
5.84 1.30 4.25 1.89 -5.56 0.000
Even though the Donations are anonymous I feel my payment 
decision could impact on my child *
4.28 2.06 5.13 1.86 2.22 0.028
External pressures (e.g. from the school or other parents etc.) 
impacted on my Voluntary Donation payment decision ***
2.44 1.89 3.79 2.13 3.60 0.000
The school administration‘s awareness of who pays the 
Voluntary Donations impacts on my payment decision *
3.37 2.19 4.30 2.15 2.24 0.027
I feel pressured to pay the Voluntary Donation by the number of 
invoices or reminders sent out by the school ***
3.34 2.32 5.18 2.14 4.26 0.000
I am made to feel guilty if I don‘t pay the Voluntary Donation ** 3.21 1.91 4.44 2.15 3.22 0.002
·         * Denotes significantly different at p < .05
·         ** Denotes significantly different at p < .01
·         *** Denotes significantly different at p < .001
Paid (N = 89) Not Paid (N = 40) T -tests
Questionnaire Items
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Demographics of the Respondents 
The results identified a significant relationship between payment decision and 
respondent‘s age, annual income, and highest level of education achievement. The t-tests for 
independent means for the demographic variables, which revealed significant differences 
between the groups, are included in Table 7. The Paid respondents were older (M = 37.64 
years), had a significantly higher income (M = $57,900), and had higher levels of education 
(M = 2.94) than the Not Paid parents, who were younger (M = 35.21 years), earned a lower 
annual income (M = $38,550), and had lower levels of education (M = 2.47). A Chi-square 
test found a significant effect of High vs. Low annual Income on payment decision, χ² (1) = 
22.80, p < .001. The other demographic variables (Ethnicity, Gender, Number of Children 
financially supported and Number of Years their Child has left at their Current School) did 
not exhibit significant differences from the comparisons of payment decision group. 
 
 
 
Table 7. 
T-tests for independent means and Mann-Whitney U Tests of Demographic Variables and Estimation of Social Norms
Mean Sd Mean Sd t -value p
30
What percentage of parents, at the school your child attends, do 
you believe pay the Voluntary Donation (%) *
59.40 11.40 53.20 11.60 -2.19 0.030
34 Age Group (Years) ** 37.64 21.80 35.21 23.69 -2.97 0.003
36 Annual household Income ($) *** 57900 16050 38550 14400 -4.73 0.000
36 (a) Annual household Income - High Versus Low *** 0.58 0.42 0.23 0.50 -5.41 0.000
37 Highest Level of Educational Achievement ** 2.94 1.15 2.47 1.16 -3.05 0.003
·         * Difference between Paid and Not Paid conditions is significant to p < .05
·         ** Difference between Paid and Not Paid conditions is significant to p < .01
·         ** Difference between Paid and Not Paid conditions is significant to p < .001
T- tests
Item Item Content
Not Paid (N = 85)Paid (N = 160)
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Unique Items 
Both questionnaires included a single item, which was unique to that condition. These items 
were excluded from all other analyses, as they did not allow comparisons between groups. 
Two t-tests for single samples were performed to examine any differences between the means 
and the neutral response for the statements (Refer to Table 5). The item from the Paid 
condition, I enjoy the feeling of satisfaction I get when I pay the Voluntary Donations 
produced a significant single sample t-test. This result implied that the feeling of satisfaction 
attained from donating might influence the payment decision of those parents who paid the 
voluntary donations, or previous payment may have produced a feeling of satisfaction, which 
reinforced future behaviour. The item from the Not Paid condition, I find it easy to forget 
about paying the Voluntary Donation produced a non-significant single sample t-test showing 
that the respondents were statistically neutral on the statement.  
 
Social Norms 
The questionnaire included an item that assessed the estimated social norm of 
payment decision. For this question, respondents were required to estimate the voluntary 
donation payment rate at their child‘s current school. The Not Paid parents estimated that a 
lower proportion of parents paid the donation (M = 53.2%, Sd = 11.6%), compared to the 
estimates of the Paid respondents (M = 59.4%, Sd = 11.4%). See Table 7 for the t-test for 
independent means of this result. 
Investigating this point further, an additional t-test for independent means was 
conducted to understand the effect High versus Low Decile rating had on the estimates of the 
social norm. The result of the t-test indicated a significant effect of High versus Low Decile, 
t(239) = 6.35, p < .001.  This result revealed that parents with children at a high decile school 
estimated that the voluntary donation payment rate was greater (M = 65.0%, Sd = 8.4%), than 
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the estimates of parents with children attending a low decile school (M = 48.6%, Sd = 
11.6%).  
 
Scale Construction 
Factor Analysis 
The analyses in the previous section identified a number of significant differences 
between the two payment decision conditions, in attitudes regarding many of the individual 
questionnaire items. While these comparisons allow for the identification of factors that 
influence payment decision, the fundamental purpose of the survey was to integrate the items 
into distinct scales within the voluntary donation framework. It was hypothesised that there 
would be three distinct constructs in the questionnaire: a political/government appraisal scale, 
a scale measuring the respondents‘ views of the school their child currently attends, and a 
scale assessing the attitudes towards the voluntary donation funding system. 
A principal factor analysis was conducted using the twenty-eight survey items (Items 
1.1 – 3.14, see Table 8 for full list) that make up the bulk of the questionnaire (the unique 
items were excluded from this analysis – item 3.12 in both conditions). A scree-plot (Figure 
1) identified a three-factor solution as the most suitable model of the data. The analysis 
measured the communalities using Multiple R
2
 with a factor loading cut-off of 0.45. The 
factors were rotated in a variance-maximizing (―varimax-raw‖) rotation of the variable space. 
An index of factor loadings, that exceeded 0.45, is included as Table 8. 
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Table 8.
Factor Matrix for the Attitudes to the Voluntary Donation Funding System Survey Questionnaire
1 2 3
1 The current government is competent 0.842
2 The current Prime Minister is doing his job well 0.797
6
The Ministry of Education organises the education system in 
New Zealand successfully
0.642
7
Overall the education system in New Zealand is well 
administered
0.639
8 The school is well organised 0.856
9 The teachers are competent and passionate 0.730
10 The administration of the school is well governed and managed 0.871
11 I have contemplated withdrawing my child from the school 
R 0.684
12 The school operates effectively with the funding it receives 0.504
14 In general the school has a successful learning environment 0.778
19
I would rather participate in fundraising ventures for the school 
than pay the Voluntary Donations
0.506
22
Even though the Donations are anonymous I feel my payment 
decision could impact on my child 
0.455
23
It is difficult for me to find the money to pay the Voluntary 
Donations
0.561
24
External pressures (e.g. from the school or other parents etc.) 
impacted on my Voluntary Donation payment decision
0.723
25
The school administration‘s awareness of who pays the 
Voluntary Donations impacts on my payment decision
0.771
26
I feel pressured to pay the Voluntary Donation by the number of 
invoices or reminders sent out by the school
0.773
28 I am made to feel guilty if I don‘t pay the Voluntary Donation 0.687
13
The school has the right to request money from families to 
supplement government funding 
(R)
0.468
16
Sufficient information is supplied by my child‘s school about the 
Voluntary Donations 
(R)
0.511
20
The Voluntary Donations are necessary for the successful 
operation of my child‘s school 
(R)
0.517
(R)
 denotes reverse scored items.
Factor
Item ContentItem
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Analysis of Scales 
„Attitudes towards the Voluntary Donations‟ scale  
The first factor fitted closely with the hypothesised ‗Attitudes towards the Voluntary 
Donations‘ scale, and included ten items from the questionnaire: 2.6 (R), 3.1 (R), 3.4, 3.5 (R), 3.7 
– 3.11, 3.13 (See Table 8). The scale had an overall eigenvalue of 6.49 and explained 23.16% 
of the total variance of the questionnaire. The reliability analysis produced a Cronbach‘s α = 
.86 and a mean item-total correlation = .39. Note: 
(R)
 denotes reverse scored items. 
 
„Views on the current School‟ scale 
The second factor was similar to the hypothesised ‗Views on the current School‘ scale 
and incorporated six items from the questionnaire (See Table 8). It included items: 2.1, 2.2, 
2.3, 2.4 
(R)
, 2.5, 2.7. The scale produced an eigenvalue of 2.66 and explained 9.50% of the 
Figure 1.
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total variance in the questionnaire. The reliability analysis generated a high Cronbach‘s α = 
.88 and a high mean item-total correlation = .59. 
 
„Political/Government Appraisal‟ Scale 
The third and smallest of the factors was the ‗Political/Government Appraisal‘ scale 
which included four questionnaire items: 1.1, 1.2, 1.6, 1.7 (See Table 8). This scale produced 
an eigenvalue of 1.97 and explained 7.04% of the total variance. The reliability analysis 
produced a Cronbach‘s α = .82 and a high mean item-total correlation = .58. 
All Scales 
The total percentage of variance accounted for by the three scales was 39.70%. The 
constructs identified in the factor analysis were arranged into separate scales by averaging the 
scores of the contributing items, for each of the scales. The three scales created through this 
modification were referred to as the ‗Attitudes towards the Voluntary Donations‘ scale, the 
‗Views on the current School‘ scale, and the ‗Political/Government Appraisal‘ scale, 
throughout this paper. The value of the scales could range from one to seven, with a high 
score indicating a positive view of the construct, and a low score indicating a negative view 
of the factor. The Cronbach‘s α and mean item-total correlations confirmed the reliability of 
the scales and showed that each was an adequate measure of the specific construct. 
 
Scales Relationships with Dependent Variables 
A series of 2 x 2 factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests were used to evaluate 
the relationship between payment decision, school decile rating, and the interaction effects of 
payment decision and decile rating, for the three scales.  
For the ‗Attitudes towards the Voluntary Donations‘ scale the results of the ANOVA 
indicated a significant effect of payment decision F(1, 234) = 37.48, p < .001, a non-
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significant effect of high versus low decile rating F(1, 234) = 1.03, p = .31, and a non-
significant interaction between payment decision and decile F(1, 234) = 3.44, p = .06. The 
solitary significant result showed that the Not Paid participants responded more negatively 
towards the ‗Attitudes towards the Voluntary Donations‘ scale, than the Paid respondents. 
For the ‗Views on the current School‘ scale, the ANOVA produced a non-significant 
effect of payment decision F(1, 239) = 0.00, p = .95, a non-significant effect of school decile 
rating F(1, 239) = 0.01, p = .94, and a non-significant interaction between payment decision 
and decile rating F(1, 239) = 2.65, p = .10. These results revealed that payment decision and 
school decile rating had seemingly little effect on the views respondents have towards their 
child‘s current school.  
For the ‗Political/Government Appraisal‘ scale, the results of the ANOVA displayed a 
significant effect of payment decision F(1, 241) = 9.53, p < .01, a significant effect of high 
versus low decile rating F(1, 241) = 8.01, p < .01, and a significant interaction between 
payment decision and decile F(1, 241) = 6.03, p < .05. The graph of the interaction (Figure 
2), illustrates the minimal difference in the responses to the scale for three of the four 
conditions. Respondents in the Not Paid – High Decile group, the Not Paid – Low Decile 
group, and the Paid – Low Decile group all exhibited similarly neutral attitudes on the scale. 
The respondents in the Paid – High Decile condition, however, held significantly more 
positive views of the Government.  
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Payment Decision Prediction Model Construction 
Discriminant Function Analysis 
As a final step of the analysis, the three scales and a selection of demographic 
variables were combined in an attempt to predict the voluntary donation payment decisions of 
the respondents.  
A backwards stepwise discriminant function analysis was employed to generate a 
predictive model by initially including the three scales, and the independent variables that 
were shown to have predictive power on group membership. The stepwise analysis 
sequentially removed the variables that failed to reach the criterion cut-off score of F ≥ 3.50. 
The independent variables included in the initial model were: the ‗Attitudes towards the 
Voluntary Donations‘ scale, the ‗Views on the current School‘ scale, the 
‗Political/Government Appraisal‘ scale, Educational Achievement, Age, estimated Social 
Norm, High vs. Low School Decile rating and High vs. Low Annual Income. The initial 
Figure 2. 
Interaction Effects of High Vs. Low Decile Rating and Payment Decision on the Political
/Government Appraisal Scale
Note: Error bars deonte +/- standard error.
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model created from this analysis encompassed the eight variables listed above and produced a 
significant, F(8, 221) = 7.72, p < .001, λ = .78. The full backwards stepwise analysis model is 
shown in Table 9. The model produced as a result of the backwards analysis was the 
combination of variables that effectively predicted payment decision group membership, 
while minimising the inclusion of variables that predict group membership by chance. 
 
A Fishers Linear Discriminant Function (FLDF) analysis model (Table 10) was used 
as the final step of this process, to determine the combination of variables that best 
discriminated between respondents from the two payment decision groups. The ‗Attitudes 
towards the Voluntary Donations‘ scale was the cornerstone of the model, providing an F = 
21.48, p < .001 in the finished model, with the other four variables in order of additional 
predictive power: High vs. Low Annual Income, Age Group, ‗Views on the current School‘ 
scale and Educational Achievement.  
 
 
 
 
Table 9. 
Backwards Stepwise Discriminant Function Analysis.
Variables Removed Step
No. of 
Variables 
in Model
F  to 
Remove
Wilks' 
Lambda
F-value 
of Model 
after 
Removal
df 1 df  2 p -value
Full Model 0 8 — 0.78 5.72 8 221 0.000
High vs. Low School Decile Rating 1 7 0.11 0.78 8.85 7 222 0.000
Estimation of Percentage of Parents who Pay 2 6 0.31 0.78 10.30 6 223 0.000
Political/Government Appraisal scale 3 5 1.34 0.79 12.08 5 224 0.000
Note: Complete model produced after third step, including five variables.
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The model produced an overall, F(5, 224) = 12.08, p < .001, λ = .79. The final model 
correctly categorised 75.00% of the respondents. The Classification Matrix produced by the 
FLDF is included as Table 11. An overall group classification of ≥ 25% better than chance 
level is considered successful discrimination between groups. The sensitivity of 
differentiation between the two groups produced a d' = 1.19 with a criterion score = 0.79 (the 
minimum level of internal certainty needed for the observer to decide that a respondent was 
in the Not Paid group).  
 
Table 10.
Summary of Fisher Linear Discriminant Function Analysis
Variables
Wilks' 
Lambda
Partial 
Wilks' 
Lambda
F-remove 
(1, 223)
p -value Toler.
1-Toler. 
(R
2
)
Attitudes towards the Voluntary Donations Scale 0.86 0.91 21.48 0.00 0.82 0.18
High vs. Low Annual Income 0.81 0.97 7.14 0.01 0.88 0.12
Age Group 0.80 0.98 4.30 0.04 0.99 0.01
Educational Achievements 0.80 0.98 3.60 0.06 0.94 0.06
Views on the current School Scale 0.80 0.98 3.70 0.06 0.87 0.13
Table 11. 
Classification Matrix for Fishers Linear Discriminant Function Analysis
Group Not Paid Paid
Percent 
Correct 
%
Not Paid 42 36 53.85
Paid 22 132 85.71
Total 64 168 75.00
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The current research programme extended our understanding of the voluntary 
donation funding system through the identification of a number of factors that affect the 
payment decision of parents, and the subsequent analysis of their relative influence. The 
findings isolated substantial differences in attitudes, beliefs, and comprehension, concerning 
the voluntary donation system, between the parents who paid and the parents who did not pay 
the donations. Closer examination revealed a significant relationship between attitudes 
towards the overall voluntary donation environment and the payment decisions of the 
respondents. The significant results for the group comparisons facilitated the identification of 
the parents who are most likely not to pay the voluntary donations, and enabled the successful 
prediction of the respondents‘ payment decisions. 
Inspection of the attitudes of respondents uncovered a strong positive correlation 
between payment decision and views of the voluntary donation funding system. Similarly, 
positive correlations, with voluntary donation payment, were identified in attitudes towards 
the current New Zealand Government and the estimates of the social norm of behaviour. The 
majority of respondents, in both conditions, held affirmative views of the school that their 
child attends. In addition, the results revealed significant positive relationships between 
payment decision and annual household income, level of educational achievement, and age.  
The following section attempted to assimilate the findings from the current 
exploratory field research with existing public goods literature. The research first identified 
the motives and attitudes that influenced voluntary donation payment decisions, and 
subsequently matched the respondents‘ behaviour with theoretical solutions to the public 
goods dilemma.  
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Explanations of Key Results 
The results identified strong positive relationships between payment decision and 
attitudes towards the voluntary donation funding system, and the New Zealand Government. 
A positive appraisal of the Government and education system was an effective predictor of 
voluntary donation payment, whereas neutral political attitudes correlated with non-payment. 
Overall, the paid respondents were substantially more positive towards the voluntary 
donation funding system, rejected the proposition that pressures affected their payment 
decision, and held a better understanding of the donations. In contrast, the not paid 
respondents were significantly more negative towards the voluntary donations, believed that 
external pressures affected their payment decision, and found the donation more financially 
difficult. Generally, the respondents‘ views of the school (that their child currently attends) 
exhibited little influence over payment decision, with the majority of parents displaying 
affirmative attitudes towards the school. 
 
Views towards the current School 
Comparison of the payment decision conditions revealed that the survey items 
designed to measure attitudes towards the school received similarly positive responses from 
the majority of parents. Both payers and non-payers held positive views of their child‘s 
teacher, principal and the school‘s learning environment, and were unlikely to consider 
withdrawing their child from the school. A high proportion of parents believed that the school 
operated effectively with the funding it received, and had a firm understanding of the school 
decile rating system and the effect it has on government funding. The results conclusively 
rejected the hypothesis that attitudes towards the school would correlate positively with 
payment decision. The findings concluded that parents‘ attitudes towards the school did not 
appear to influence voluntary donation payments.  
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Political/Government Appraisal 
A parent‘s positive attitude towards the Government was significantly correlated with 
voluntary donation payment. In addition to exhibiting more positives attitudes towards the 
‗Political/Government Appraisal‘ scale, the paid parents were significantly more positive 
towards the Prime Minister (The Rt. Hon. John Key during the research), the Government 
(the National Party), and the overall education system, than the not paid parents. These 
positive political attitudes may have motivated the parents to pay the donations. In contrast, 
the not paid parents exhibited neutral political opinions, which may have influenced (or 
reinforced) their decision not to pay the voluntary donations. The political attitudes of a 
respondent revealed a marginal level of predictive value on voluntary donation payment 
decision.  
 
Attitudes towards the Voluntary Donations funding system 
The present findings indicate that attitudes towards the voluntary donation funding 
system was the major determinant influencing payment decision. The ‗Attitudes towards the 
Voluntary Donations‘ scale predicted the most variance in the payment decision prediction 
model and was the strongest overall contributor to the prediction of payment decision. 
In general, the results supported the hypothesis that attitudes towards the voluntary 
donation funding system would positively correlate with payment of the donations. The 
strongest predictors of payment were a belief that the request for a donation was within the 
rights of the school, and that the donations are necessary in the successful operation of the 
school. Affirmation of the existence of external pressures, which complicate voluntary 
donation payment decisions, was strongly correlated with non-payment.  
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Comprehension of the Voluntary Donation funding system 
Attitudes towards the general comprehension of the voluntary donation system were 
moderately positive for the majority of parents. The strong positive correlation between the 
perceived necessity of the donations and payment, suggests that a non-payer‘s beliefs that the 
donations were unnecessary for school funding could have influenced their decision not to 
contribute. In addition, payment was positively related to a belief that the request for 
donations was within the rights of the school and an awareness of the tax exemption available 
on the donations. These observations suggest that an explicit understanding of the 
indispensability of the voluntary donations to school funding, and that requests for donations 
are within the rights of the school, would theoretically improve the contribution rate of the 
donations. Encouraging parents to exploit the tax benefits available on charitable 
contributions, may have a similar effect on increasing the voluntary donation payment rate. 
 
Fundraising Participation 
The research identified that a parent‘s attitude towards the use of an alternative to the 
donations was dependent on payment decision. The parents who did not pay the donations 
believed that schools should allow parents the opportunity to participate in fundraising 
ventures for the school, as an alternative to paying the donation. In contrast, the parents who 
paid were opposed to the idea. Perhaps an alternative for schools is to offer non-contributing 
parents the opportunity to donate their time to school enterprise as a substitute for their 
voluntary donations. 
 
External Pressures on Payment Decision 
Contention surrounds the existence of external influences that have an effect on 
payment of the voluntary donations. Substantial anecdotal (and media) evidence 
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acknowledges the existence of pressures on the voluntary contributions of parents to state 
schools (Rudman, 2008; Minto, 2009) and the charitable contributions to churches 
(Soetevent, 2005). The present study found that a parent‘s identification of pressure, in the 
payment decision process, was negatively correlated with payment. In particular, a parent‘s 
belief that their payment decision impacts on their child, a belief that the school‘s awareness 
of contributions affected payment decision, and a perception of pressure due to the number of 
reminders sent by the school, were strong predictors of voluntary donation non-payment. 
These results suggest that the threat or actuality of punishment from the school influenced the 
payment decision of the non-payers more than the payers. The evidence refutes the 
presumption that payments were enforced via formal punishments, but rather informal 
sanctions from the school, such as social disapproval or an implication of guilt. 
 
External Pressures evident in High Decile Schools 
The most substantial evidence for the existence of coercion techniques and pressures 
on payment was observed in high decile schools. The parents with a child at a low decile 
school (i.e. 1 – 5) held firm beliefs that the school, and community, did not use punishments 
or sanctions, to influence their voluntary donation payment decisions. Conversely, in high 
decile schools (i.e. 6 – 10) the perception of external influences and informal sanctions was 
negatively correlated with payment. Analogous to the results identified regarding the general 
existence of pressure on donations, the most predictive factors in high decile schools were 
regarding informal sanctions imposed by the school. The belief that their child was negatively 
affected by the parent‘s payment decision, and that they were made to feel guilty for not 
paying the donation, revealed strong negative relationships with payment. Additionally, a 
belief that the school used invoices and reminders to pressure the parents was a stable 
predictor of non-contribution. A parent‘s belief that the school administrations‘ awareness of 
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contributions caused pressure on their payment decision was also positively related to non-
payment of the donation.  
The prevalence of decile-dependent attitudes towards pressure suggests that high 
decile schools – where the voluntary donations are essential to supplement government 
funding – use informal social sanctions to pressure parents into paying the donations. The 
findings showed that the pressures on payments were imposed predominantly by the school, 
as opposed to coming from the community or other parents. The increased reliance on 
pressure to encourage payments in high decile schools, whether intentional or unintentional, 
might be a school‘s desperate attempt to raise the additional funding needed to sustain a 
successful learning environment (Woulfe, 2009), or an expectation that parents from more 
affluent communities can more easily afford to help with funding.  
 
Effect of Demographic Factors on Payment Decision 
The present study identified that payment of the voluntary donations had a strong 
positive relationship with age, and annual household income. The results are consistent with 
the findings of List (2004), who reported that age positively correlated with charitable giving, 
and Hochman and Rodgers (1973), who found that giving to local charities was highly 
sensitive to the distribution of income within the community. The research also established a 
significant positive correlation between level of educational achievement and payment of the 
voluntary donations. 
Income was confounded by respondents‘ age and educational achievement. Older, 
well-educated parents earn a higher annual income compared to younger, less educated 
parents. It is intuitive that parents with a higher salary would have more disposable income to 
spend on the voluntary donations. In addition, parents who have a higher level of educational 
achievement might place greater value on the education of their children, and contribute to 
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the donations more readily. While income was highly positively correlated with payment of 
the donations, it was only the second largest contributor to the payment decision prediction 
model (preceded by attitudes towards the voluntary donation system). 
 
RESPONSE TO ECONOMIC THEORY 
Extensive observations of natural and laboratory examples of public goods have 
concluded that many individuals will voluntarily contribute to the provision of public goods 
(Andreoni, 1990). The general approach when studying the voluntary contribution 
mechanism is to assume that individuals receive a private benefit from their personal 
contribution, in addition to the marginal benefit received from their use of the public good. 
This private benefit is presumed to encourage contributions above the level that would be 
expected if benefits were derived from the use of public good alone. Explanations of the 
private benefits that motivate voluntary contributions range from behavioural factors, such as 
altruism, and warm-glow to complex theories of interdependent behaviour, which stimulate 
social approval and disapproval, such as cooperation, and reciprocity (Kotchen, 2006). The 
current research aimed to assimilate the major determinants of voluntary donation payment, 
with the solutions to the public goods problems presented in the Introduction.   
 
Social Norms 
Public goods research has demonstrated that, even in situations without negative 
sanctions, social comparison information can affect the contributions of individuals (Shang & 
Croson, 2008). In a recent field experiment, Frey and Meier (2004) identified a positive 
correlation between beliefs about the contribution rate of the reference group (the proportion 
of a group who donated to a charity) and an individual‘s behaviour. The authors found that 
the overall contribution rate of the participants decreased when they were informed that forty-
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six percent of the reference group contributed, and increased when they were informed that 
sixty-four percent contributed. Instead of informing the participants of the overall 
contribution rate (the manipulation Frey and Meier used to facilitate contributions), the 
current study elected to examine respondents‘ perception of the social norm by asking them 
to estimate the voluntary donation contribution rate at their child‘s school.  
Consistent with previous research on interdependent behaviour, a parent‘s estimate of 
the overall payment rate was positively correlated with voluntary donation payment. 
Specifically, the respondents who paid the donations estimated that the payment rate at their 
child‘s school was significantly higher (59.4%), than the respondents who did not pay 
(53.2%). The current result is in line with Frey and Meier‘s findings that an individual‘s 
contribution reacts to relatively small changes in the (perceived) contribution rate of a 
reference group. This observation is consistent with other public goods field studies, which 
identified that social information about the contributions of others positively influences an 
individual‘s contribution (Shang & Croson, 2009; Fehr & Gächter, 2006).  
For voluntary donation payments, the social norm may not be consistent across all 
domains. In different schools or communities, the norm may vary depending on the group 
enforcing the payment, and the value placed on the contributions. The existing research on 
social norms seldom analyses how the norm develops in a certain situation (Vesterlund, 
2006). The present study, however, identified a theoretical pathway for the establishment of 
social norms in voluntary donation contributions. For this situation, the school and 
community enforced the social norm. The existence of distinct social norms in different 
socio-economic communities was supported by the parents‘ decile-dependent estimates of 
payment proportion. Specifically, the respondents‘ estimates of payment proportion were 
greater in high decile schools (65%), than the estimated rate in low decile schools (49%).  
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In high decile schools (where per student government subsidies are the lowest), 
payment of the donation is essential to supplement the funding received from the government 
(Marvin, 2009). Therefore, the administrations of high decile schools attempt to enforce the 
payment more ardently, and may manipulate the social norm to encourage parents to pay the 
voluntary donations. The current study found that many parents, in high decile schools, 
perceived the existence of pressures, especially informal sanctions, in relation to their 
voluntary donation payments. This finding is consistent with anecdotal evidence that schools 
use informal punishments and peer pressure, to encourage the payment of the donations 
(Minto, 2009). In contrast, low decile schools require less from parents through the voluntary 
donations because they receive a higher government subsidy per student. Consequently, these 
schools can afford to employ a ‗pay if you can‘ philosophy regarding the donations. 
Enforcement of the social norm in low decile schools reflected the perceived necessity of the 
donations. The present findings support this theory, as very few parents identified the use of 
pressures or sanctions in low decile schools. Thus, the parents with children who attend a low 
decile school may align their voluntary donation payment decision with the perceived social 
norm of non-payment, resulting in the lower payment proportion observed in these schools.  
 
Cooperation and Reciprocity 
Confirmation of functional social norms in the voluntary donation system, allowed the 
extension of the findings to related theories of interdependent behaviour. Fischbacher and 
Gächter‘s (2006) examination of cooperation in a public goods game found that eliciting 
estimates of the average contribution of a reference group, allowed the identification of 
positive and stable correlations between beliefs and contributions. The authors concluded that 
the effect was the result of conditionally cooperative individuals. Consistent with previous 
field research (Shang & Croson, 2008; 2009; Fehr & Gächter, 2006), the present findings 
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revealed that perceptions of the contributions of others positively influenced an individual‘s 
contribution to the voluntary donations. The positive relationship between social norms and 
payment decision infers that the parents who chose to pay the donations were behaving in 
accordance with their perceptions of the contribution rate of the school. Therefore, their 
payment of the donation was a reciprocal or conditionally cooperative response to the 
contributions of other parents. The non-payers perceptions of a lower voluntary donation 
payment proportion, however, allowed them to free ride without the guilt or social 
disapproval associated with non-conformity. 
 
Punishment and Counter-Punishment 
Whilst a parent‘s identification of coercive sanctions and punishments that influence 
payment decision was negatively related to voluntary donation payment, the results were 
inconclusive on the way in which perceived reprisal influenced behaviour. It was expected 
that the payers would be more aware of the sanctions associated with the influence of 
voluntary donations than the non-payers. From this perspective, the payers would be 
motivated to contribute to the donations by their awareness of the sanctions used to 
encourage behaviour, and their desire to avoid the associated social punishments. The results, 
however, conclusively rejected this hypothesis by demonstrating that a perception of pressure 
was positively correlated with non-payment. The findings suggest that the sanctions were 
either insufficient to influence the payment decision of the non-payers or the effect of 
pressure galvanised their payment decision, and actively discouraged contribution. 
Consistent with this observation, non-contribution could be an individual‘s response 
to the punishments and sanctions associated with non-payment of the voluntary donations. 
Public goods games have examined the use of counter-punishment in the laboratory and 
observed that non-contributors will use ‗anti-social‘ punishment to retaliate against the 
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sanctions imposed by contributors (Nikiforakis, 2008). Thus, counter-punishment is a 
response to the punishment meted out on uncooperative individuals, and often results in a 
substantial reduction in contribution (Chaudhuri, 2007). Following from this theory, free 
riding in the voluntary donation system may be an individual‘s retaliation to the sanctions 
imposed by the school, which could contribute to the lower payment rate observed in the 
parents who perceived punishments for non-payment. 
 
The Impact of Guilt and Shame 
Analogous to the economic perspective of guilt aversion (Charness & Dufwenberg, 
2006), a parent who desires the approval of others within the school community (e.g. the 
administration or other parents), will experience guilt if they believe their payment decision 
fails to comply with the socially accepted behaviour (i.e. paying the voluntary donation). In 
the present study, a parent‘s perception of the influence of guilt on their payment decision 
was positively correlated with non-payment. This observation was substantially more 
pronounced in the group comparisons of high decile schools, revealing that the guilt on non-
contribution was more evident in higher socio-economic schools, than in low decile schools.  
In the voluntary donation system, the implication of guilt from an external source did 
not motivate an individual to correct or modify their socially undesirable behaviour (i.e. non-
payment). Instead, similar to the observation of counter-punishment, the perception of guilt 
appeared to actively discourage payment of the voluntary donations. This observation is 
consistent with the psychological distinction between guilt and shame. The implication of 
guilt motivates an individual to ‗repair‘ or ‗amend‘ their socially undesirable actions. In 
contrast, shame evokes a negative reaction to the source of the shame, and often results in 
retaliatory anger (Tangney et al, 1992). Thus, a parent‘s internal response to the implication 
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of guilt is likely to manifest as a feeling of shame, which stimulates anger towards those who 
enforce the social norm, and reinforces their non-contribution. 
 
Altruism 
The research used the return rate of the questionnaires as an informal measure of 
altruism. All respondents received the same incentives for participating in the research, but 
the payers responded at nearly twice the rate of their non-paying counterparts, revealing a 
strong correlation between return rate and the payment decisions of parents. Whilst this is not 
a perfect measure of the altruistic tendencies of a parent, it is reasonable that, because no 
tangible benefit was gained from responding to the research, the parents who returned their 
questionnaires were more motivated by altruism, or a feeling of kindness, than the parents 
who did not return the questionnaires. Thus, the altruism that initiated questionnaire 
completion and return might also be an influencing factor in the payment of the voluntary 
donations.  
 
Identifiability 
Identification as a non-contributor has a significant effect on encouraging cooperation 
in public goods games (Croson & Marks, 1998). Removal of the anonymity of a contribution 
decision compounds the feeling of guilt associated with non-contribution, and causes pressure 
through the implication of social disapproval. A school administration‘s awareness of an 
individual‘s payment decision concerned the non-payers, more than payers. Identification as 
a parent who does not pay the voluntary donations had a weak relationship with payment 
decision, a trend that was more prominent in high decile schools. The statement did not 
attract the strength of opinion expected, but some respondents chose to include unsolicited 
comments regarding payment identifiability. For example, one respondent commented, ―the 
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donations are not as anonymous as you think‖, and another concluded, ―the payments are not 
anonymous and its unfair [sic]‖. This suggests that some non-paying parents are particularly 
negative towards the pressures associated with payment identification. 
A school‘s use of invoices and reminders to elicit payment of the donations had a 
strong influence on payment decision. The perception of pressure associated with the use of 
reminders was positively correlated with non-payment. This sanction may have had a 
function beyond the attempted encouragement of payment, as it informally identified a non-
contributing parent, and was likely to discourage the voluntary donations. Predictably, this 
effect was substantially more pronounced in high decile schools with non-payers holding 
attitudes that pressure from this source influenced their payment decision. The proposition 
that identification of payment decision discourages donations is consistent with the previous 
evidence on counter punishment, whereby parents are using non-contribution as retaliation 
against sanctioning from the school. 
 
 
Limitations 
In the opinion of the researcher, the current study was successful in extending our 
understanding of the factors that influence the voluntary donation funding system. The 
research was, however, not without its limitations, some of which may affect the 
generalisability of the findings.  
Firstly, the sample of schools was not randomly selected. The study intentionally 
employed few criteria for selecting schools. The selection process, however, was mediated by 
the schools‘ willingness to participate. It was presumed that many of the schools that chose to 
participate in the study had an interest in voluntary donation research, which may correlate 
with a previous problem regarding the collection rates of the parental contributions. This may 
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introduce an element of bias, whereby the participating schools were appreciably different to 
the general school population.  
The schools were only selected from the Christchurch City district because of the 
proximity to the researcher. The research, therefore, excluded schools from rural areas or 
other New Zealand cities. Whether a school is located in an urban area, or in a less densely 
populated rural area, may affect its scale of operations, or the level of support received from 
the community. For example, rural communities may see the school as a focus of community 
involvement (Alexander & Jaforullah, 2004). In addition, the selection process yielded 
differences in the proportion of schools from the single-sex and co-educational domains, and 
included significantly more primary schools than intermediate or secondary schools. Future 
research could employ a more representative sample of New Zealand schools to improve the 
generalisability of the findings. 
The selection of participants was at the discretion of the schools. The school 
administration organised the delivery of the questionnaires to a selection of the parents of 
their students. Even though the schools were given clear instructions to randomly select 
participants from the entire school population, it was impossible (and would violate the terms 
of the ethics agreement) for the researcher to interfere with the distribution samples. The 
researcher‘s lack of control over selection resulted in a disproportionate number of female 
respondents compared to males, and substantially more New Zealand Europeans compared to 
other ethnicities. The disparity in demographic samples could reflect the actual composition 
of the selected schools, or reflect a problem with the comprehension of the language used in 
the questionnaire by non-European New Zealanders.  
A respondent‘s concern that their responses could be discovered by their school‘s 
administration, and reflect negatively on their child or family, may have resulted in the 
positive trend observed in attitudes towards the school. Even though response anonymity was 
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assured, the fact that the school controlled questionnaire distribution may have influenced 
responses, especially towards the ‗Views of the current School‘ scale survey items. 
An element of nonresponse bias may have an effect on the generalisability of the 
results, even though the return rate of the current research was higher than anticipated. 
Academics contend that a response rate of below sixty percent creates difficulty in making 
representative judgements because of the introduction of nonresponse bias (Schutt, 1999). 
The nonresponse bias causes problems in extending the conclusions from the research to the 
entire population because the individuals who did not respond may be appreciably different 
to the respondents (Hager et al., 2003). It was hypothesised that an overall return rate of 
between ten and fifteen percent was likely due the contentiousness of the issue and the 
personal nature of the information requested. Compounding the problem, mail surveys are 
especially difficult to administer and enforce. A recent study on attitudes to debt, which 
surveyed debtors and creditors, had an overall return rate of five percent for a similarly 
contentious issue (Mewse et al., 2010). Therefore, the current return rate (31%) was 
reasonable, given the collection process and the delicate nature of the information sought, 
which may reflect the respondents‘ genuine interest in the topic. 
While it is apparent that field research holds an important place in economic and 
psychological study, the discipline does have limitations. The quasi-experimental nature of 
the present study reduced the researcher‘s ability to define causal relationships between 
attitudes and behaviour. In addition, the scope for generalisability is limited, as the 
conclusions drawn from this research may apply only to the voluntary contributions in the 
state schools of New Zealand. Further research is needed to extend the current study to other 
voluntary contribution mechanisms in impure public goods institutions, with the introduction 
of experimental control to allow causal judgements.  
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The current research excluded the state-integrated school system. Schools from this 
system are privately owned, and have a ‗special character‘ usually based upon a religious or 
educational philosophy. These educational institutions have very different voluntary donation 
collection processes, compared to state schools, and all collect fees or attendance dues as part 
of their enrolment (Ministry of Education, 2008).  
 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
How can Schools Encourage the Voluntary Donations? 
An intuitive, yet surprisingly understated, solution to the problem of dwindling 
voluntary donation payment rates is to make it more salient that the donations are 
indispensable for school funding. In general, the results indicated that parents had a moderate 
understanding of the donations, but that the majority of non-paying parents did not perceive 
the donations as necessary to fund the school. This is consistent with the findings of Kemp 
(1998), who reported that the perceived necessity of a good is strongly related to the desire to 
regulate its distribution, especially if the good is underprovided. Educating parents to 
understand that the money received from parental contributions is essential in supporting a 
well organised and successful school environment, may improve voluntary donation payment 
rates.  
The attitudes that parents hold towards the voluntary donation funding system was the 
best predictor of payment decision in the current study. Therefore, managing the views of the 
donations would theoretically have a strong effect on encouraging contributions. A general 
improvement in the quality, and availability, of the information provided to parents about the 
voluntary donations would reduce any chance of misinterpretation of the payments. The 
information presented to parents should clearly explain that schools have the right (under the 
law) to request money from parents to supplement government funding. The explanation 
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should also illustrate that without funding from the voluntary donations, the quality of 
education provided would be significantly reduced. Informing parents of the availability of a 
tax exemption may also encourage payment of the voluntary donations.  
In order to increase the voluntary donation payment rate, it is advisable for schools to 
have an understanding of the theoretical difference between public and private benefits. The 
contribution decision of an individual is dependent on the combination of benefits received 
from their personal use of the public good and extraneous private benefits. Theoretically, an 
individual only contributes to a public good if they perceive an increase in the quality of the 
good from their personal contribution (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Specifically, if a parent were 
solely concerned for the education of their child, that parent would not contribute to the 
school if they were unable to distinguish between the quality of education provided in the 
presence, and absence of their donation. It is proposed that more parents would contribute to 
the voluntary donations if they perceive that their contribution returns a marginal benefit to 
their child. Providing information regarding the specific benefits of a charitable contribution 
has been found to increase donations in public goods contexts (Vesterlund, 2006). Therefore, 
schools need to inform parents of the hypothetical benefits afforded to each child from a 
parent‘s contribution.  For example, a school could state that one parent‘s voluntary donation 
would allow the employment of an extra support teacher for a day, or the purchase of 
innovative learning software for the school‘s computer system.  
The present research found that an individual‘s charitable contribution to a school was 
influenced by the contributions of others. This is consistent with previous field experiments 
that have demonstrated a positive correlation between an individual‘s contribution and their 
beliefs regarding the contributions of the group (Shang & Croson, 2009; Frey & Meier, 
2004). Shang and Croson (2008) found that presenting information regarding recent 
contributions strongly influenced payment decision, especially if the previous contributor was 
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similar to the individual. From this perspective, a school could increase the proportion of 
parents who pay the voluntary donations by informing the parents of a payment rate that 
exceeded the school‘s current collection percentage. While the researcher does not condone 
direct deception, a school could reveal the payment rate of a similar school in the area that 
receives a higher proportion of their voluntary donations. Alternatively, informing the parents 
of a high contribution rate in a previous year, could influence the impression of the social 
norm, and encourage payment of the donations.  
Finally, the examination of external pressures on payment decision revealed that the 
schools that employed the use of sanctions in an attempt to encourage payment, often had the 
opposite effect on contributions. The findings proposed that pressures and sanctions from the 
school galvanised the payment decision of the non-payers, instead of persuading the parents 
to donate. Encouraging contributions from the parents who do not pay could be achieved by 
reducing or removing any implication of pressure associated with the donations. Allowing 
parents to make an informed decision on whether or not to donate without the influence of 
coercive sanctions could facilitate an increase in contributions.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The current research was important given the lack of previous empirical research into 
the voluntary donation funding system of New Zealand state schools.  Substantial media 
scrutiny on the topic has highlighted the controversy surrounding the requests for 
contributions from parents, and has divided public opinion on the existence of a free 
education in this country. 
The current investigation extended our knowledge of the voluntary donation funding 
system through the identification of a number of factors that affect the payment decision of 
parents. The research revealed a strong correlation between attitudes and voluntary donation 
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payments, suggesting that payment decisions are dynamic, and therefore, changeable. The 
findings identified that a combination of demographic factors and dynamic attitudes 
effectively predicted payment decision. The strongest overall predictor of voluntary donation 
payment was respondents‘ attitudes towards the voluntary donation funding system. This 
factor was significantly more important in the identification of non-contributors, than income, 
which suggests that attitudes are more instrumental in the decision making process of a parent 
than financial means. In general, this thesis should be viewed as an innovative interpretation 
of an impure public goods field experiment, which cautiously supports current economic 
theory. 
A school principal, Board of Trustees member, Parent Teacher Association affiliate, 
or any other interested party attempting to increase voluntary donation payment rates should 
understand that a parent‘s voluntary donation payment decision is largely based on beliefs 
and attitudes, and, as such, is compliant to manipulation. With the right motivation, the 
majority of parents can be persuaded to comprehend the indispensability of the donations, 
which may ultimately lead to an increase in contributions. 
In general, the study allowed for a deeper understanding of the factors that motivate 
individuals to pay a voluntary donation to state schools. It also acts as a steppingstone for 
future research that aims to investigate the effects attitudes and social influences have on the 
prediction, and explanation, of human behaviour, especially in the New Zealand education 
system.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Department of Psychology  
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Attitudes towards the Voluntary Donation system of New Zealand State Schools 
 
 
This questionnaire is part of a research program carried out into Attitudes towards the 
‘Voluntary Donations’ requested by NZ state schools. The Voluntary Donations are 
optional contributions to the running of the school. Schools request the donations from 
parents and families to supplement the funding they receive from the government.  
 
Please refer to the information sheet provided for a more detailed description of this research 
project.  
 
The questions on the next five pages ask for your opinion of the current New Zealand 
government, your attitudes regarding the school your child currently attends and your views 
on the Voluntary Donations that your child‘s school collects. If you have children at more 
than one State school please answer about your youngest child and his/her school. On 
each of the following five pages you will be asked your opinion on various statements that 
assess the three categories. Answer by circling the number which indicates how strongly 
you agree or disagree with each statement. 
 
The project has been reviewed and approved by the UC Human Ethics Committee. 
 
By completing the questionnaire it is understood that you have consented to participate 
in the project, and that you consent to publication of the results of the project with the 
understanding that anonymity will be preserved.  
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Following is a list of seven statements concerning the current New Zealand government 
and education system. Please read each one and indicate how much you agree or disagree 
with that statement. The scale goes from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. The 
neutral point is 4 = neither agree nor disagree. Please consider each statement carefully and 
answer as honestly as possible. 
 
 
1. The current government is competent   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
       Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
2. The current Prime Minister is doing   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
his job well      Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
3.  The educational policies of a political    
party are important when I decide    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
who to vote for     Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
4. Free education is a right that all New   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Zealanders deserve     Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
5. Education should be compulsory for   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
all children in New Zealand   Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
6. The Ministry of Education organises    
the education system in New Zealand   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
successfully     Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
7. Overall the education system in New   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Zealand is well administered   Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
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Next is a list of eight statements regarding the school your child currently attends. 
Please read each one and indicate how much you agree or disagree with that statement. The 
scale goes from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. The neutral point is 4 = neither 
agree nor disagree. Please consider each statement carefully and answer as honestly as 
possible. 
 
 
8. The school is well organised    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
       Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
9. The teachers are competent and    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
passionate      Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
10. The administration of the school    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
is well governed and managed   Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
11. I have contemplated withdrawing my   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
child from the school    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
12. The school operates effectively with   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
the funding it receives    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
13. The school has the right to request 
money from families to supplement   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
government funding    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree  
 
14. In general the school has a successful   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
learning environment    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
15. I understand the school decile rating     
system and how it affects    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
government funding to schools    Strongly disagree  Strongly agree 
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The following fourteen statements (on the next two pages) relate to the ‘Voluntary 
Donations’ your child’s school requests.  Please read each one and indicate how much you 
agree or disagree with that statement. The scale goes from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree. The neutral point is 4 = neither agree nor disagree. Please consider each 
statement carefully and answer as honestly as possible. 
 
 
16. Sufficient information is supplied by  
my child‘s school about the    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Voluntary Donations         Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
17. I understand what the Voluntary    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Donations are used for    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
18. I understand from the information      
provided that the Donations are    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
completely optional    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
19. I would rather participate in     
fundraising ventures for the school   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
than pay the Voluntary Donations   Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
20. The Voluntary Donations are  
necessary for the successful    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
operation of my child‘s school        Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
 
21. I am aware that a tax exemption        
is available on the money I    1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
pay as a Voluntary Donations    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
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Please read each of the following eight statements and indicate how much you agree or 
disagree with that statement. The scale goes from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. 
The neutral point is 4 = neither agree nor disagree. Please consider each statement carefully 
and answer as honestly as possible. 
 
22. Even though the Donations are     
anonymous I feel my payment    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
decision could impact on my child    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
   
23. It is difficult for me to find the money   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
to pay the Voluntary Donations   Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
24. External pressures (e.g. from the school       
or other parents etc.) impacted on my   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Voluntary Donation payment decision  Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
25. The school administration‘s awareness        
of who pays the Voluntary Donations   1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
impacts on my payment decision  Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
26. I feel pressured to pay the Voluntary     
Donation by the number of invoices   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
or reminders sent out by the school  Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
  
27. I enjoy the feeling of satisfaction  I get   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
when I pay the Voluntary Donations   Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
       
28. I am made to feel guilty if I don‘t pay   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
the Voluntary Donation    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
29. The school withholds extra-curricular    
activities (e.g. Camps or Trips) from   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
my child if I don‘t pay the Donation   Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
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Finally, eight demographic questions: 
 
30. What percentage of parents, at the school your child attends, do you believe pay the 
Voluntary Donation? 
 20% or less       21 – 40%       41 – 60%       61 - 80%       81% - 100% 
   (Please circle one) 
 
31. How many children, under the age of 18, do you financially support? 
 1  2  3  4  5 or more 
   (Please circle one) 
 
32. How many years do you expect your youngest child to continue attending their current school 
including this year? 
  1  2  3  4  5 or more 
    (Please circle one) 
 
33. What is your gender? Male        Female  
   (Please circle one) 
 
34. What age group do you belong to? 
 20 – 28       29 – 37       38 – 46       47 – 55       56 – 64       65 or over  
   (Please circle one) 
 
35. What Ethnic group do you identify with (you may select more than one)? 
 NZ European  Māori  Pacific Islander  Asian  Other 
   (Please circle one) 
 
36. What is your annual household income (combination of you and your partner after tax)? 
 Under 20,000  20,001 – 35,000     35,001 – 50,000     50,001 – 65,000    
 65,001 – 80,000    80,001 – 95,000    95,001 – 110,000    110,001 or over  
   (Please circle one) 
 
37. What is the highest level of educational qualification you have achieved? 
 No formal qualification    High School qualification Tertiary Diploma/Certificate 
 Under-Graduate Degree    Post-Graduate Qualification 
   (Please circle one) 
 
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Department of Psychology  
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Attitudes towards the Voluntary Donation system of New Zealand State Schools 
 
 
This questionnaire is part of a research program carried out into Attitudes towards the 
‘Voluntary Donations’ requested by NZ state schools. The Voluntary Donations are 
optional contributions to the running of the school. Schools request the donations from 
parents and families to supplement the funding they receive from the government.  
 
Please refer to the information sheet provided for a more detailed description of this research 
project.  
 
The questions on the next five pages ask for your opinion of the current New Zealand 
government, your attitudes regarding the school your child currently attends and your views 
on the Voluntary Donations that your child‘s school collects. If you have children at more 
than one State school please answer about your youngest child and his/her school. On 
each of the following five pages you will be asked your opinion on various statements that 
assess the three categories. Answer by circling the number which indicates how strongly 
you agree or disagree with each statement. 
 
The project has been reviewed and approved by the UC Human Ethics Committee. 
 
By completing the questionnaire it is understood that you have consented to participate 
in the project, and that you consent to publication of the results of the project with the 
understanding that anonymity will be preserved.  
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Following is a list of seven statements concerning the current New Zealand government 
and education system. Please read each one and indicate how much you agree or disagree 
with that statement. The scale goes from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. The 
neutral point is 4 = neither agree nor disagree. Please consider each statement carefully and 
answer as honestly as possible. 
 
 
1. The current government is competent   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
       Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
2. The current Prime Minister is doing   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
his job well      Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
3.  The educational policies of a political    
party are important when I decide    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
who to vote for     Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
4. Free education is a right that all New   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Zealanders deserve     Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
5. Education should be compulsory for   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
all children in New Zealand   Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
6. The Ministry of Education organises    
the education system in New Zealand   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
successfully     Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
7. Overall the education system in New   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Zealand is well administered   Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
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Next is a list of eight statements regarding the school your child currently attends. 
Please read each one and indicate how much you agree or disagree with that statement. The 
scale goes from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. The neutral point is 4 = neither 
agree nor disagree. Please consider each statement carefully and answer as honestly as 
possible. 
 
 
8. The school is well organised    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
       Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
9. The teachers are competent and    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
passionate      Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
10. The administration of the school    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
is well governed and managed   Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
11. I have contemplated withdrawing my   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
child from the school    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
12. The school operates effectively with   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
the funding it receives    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
13. The school has the right to request 
money from families to supplement   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
government funding    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree  
 
14. In general the school has a successful   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
learning environment    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
15. I understand the school decile rating     
system and how it affects    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
government funding to schools    Strongly disagree  Strongly agree 
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The following fourteen statements (on the next two pages) relate to the ‘Voluntary 
Donations’ your child’s school requests.  Please read each one and indicate how much you 
agree or disagree with that statement. The scale goes from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = 
strongly agree. The neutral point is 4 = neither agree nor disagree. Please consider each 
statement carefully and answer as honestly as possible. 
 
 
16. Sufficient information is supplied by  
my child‘s school about the    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Voluntary Donations         Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
17. I understand what the Voluntary    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Donations are used for    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
18. I understand from the information      
provided that the Donations are    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
completely optional    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
19. I would rather participate in     
fundraising ventures for the school   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
than pay the Voluntary Donations   Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
20. The Voluntary Donations are  
necessary for the successful    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
operation of my child‘s school        Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
 
21. I am aware that a tax exemption        
is available on the money I    1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
pay as a Voluntary Donations    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
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Please read each of the following eight statements and indicate how much you agree or 
disagree with that statement. The scale goes from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. 
The neutral point is 4 = neither agree nor disagree. Please consider each statement carefully 
and answer as honestly as possible. 
 
22. Even though the Donations are     
anonymous I feel my payment    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
decision could impact on my child    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
   
23. It is difficult for me to find the money   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
to pay the Voluntary Donations   Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
24. External pressures (e.g. from the school       
or other parents etc.) impacted on my   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
Voluntary Donation payment decision  Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
25. The school administration‘s awareness        
of who pays the Voluntary Donations   1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
impacts on my payment decision  Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
26. I feel pressured to pay the Voluntary     
Donation by the number of invoices   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
or reminders sent out by the school  Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
27. I find it easy to forget about paying   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
the Voluntary Donation    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
28. I am made to feel guilty if I don‘t pay   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
the Voluntary Donation    Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
 
29. The school withholds extra-curricular    
activities (e.g. Camps or Trips) from   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
my child if I don‘t pay the Donation   Strongly disagree              Strongly agree 
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Finally, eight demographic questions: 
 
30. What percentage of parents, at the school your child attends, do you believe pay the 
Voluntary Donation? 
 20% or less       21 – 40%       41 – 60%       61 - 80%       81% - 100% 
   (Please circle one) 
 
31. How many children, under the age of 18, do you financially support? 
 1  2  3  4  5 or more 
   (Please circle one) 
 
32. How many years do you expect your youngest child to continue attending their current school 
including this year? 
  1  2  3  4  5 or more 
    (Please circle one) 
 
33. What is your gender? Male        Female  
   (Please circle one) 
 
34. What age group do you belong to? 
 20 – 28       29 – 37       38 – 46       47 – 55       56 – 64       65 or over  
   (Please circle one) 
 
35. What Ethnic group do you identify with (you may select more than one)? 
 NZ European  Māori  Pacific Islander  Asian  Other 
   (Please circle one) 
 
36. What is your annual household income (combination of you and your partner after tax)? 
 Under 20,000  20,001 – 35,000     35,001 – 50,000     50,001 – 65,000    
 65,001 – 80,000    80,001 – 95,000    95,001 – 110,000    110,001 or over  
   (Please circle one) 
 
37. What is the highest level of educational qualification you have achieved? 
 No formal qualification    High School qualification Tertiary Diploma/Certificate 
 Under-Graduate Degree    Post-Graduate Qualification 
   (Please circle one) 
 
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ref:  HEC 2010/53  
 
 
 
12 May 2010 
 
 
Andrew Crerar 
Department of Psychology 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 
 
 
 
Dear Andrew   
 
The Human Ethics Committee advises that your research proposal ―An investigation into the 
voluntary donation system of New Zealand state schools‖ has been considered and approved.   
 
Please note that this approval is subject to the incorporation of the amendments you have 
provided in your email of 7 May 2010. 
 
Best wishes for your project. 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Michael Grimshaw 
Chair, Human Ethics Committee 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Department of Psychology  
 
Information Sheet 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project into Attitudes towards the ‘Voluntary 
Donations’ system of NZ state schools by completing the enclosed questionnaire. The 
Voluntary Donations are optional contributions, from parents and families, to the running of 
the school which supplement government funding.  
 
Your participation in this research is completely anonymous and any information you supply 
is private. The results of the project may be published, but you can be assured of the complete 
confidentiality for data gathered in this investigation. The information you supply will not be 
available to your child‘s school administration and your choosing not to participate will have 
no consequence for your child. Participation is optional and you may withdraw your 
participation, including withdrawal of any information you have provided, at any time until 
your questionnaire has been returned to the researcher. Please note that completed theses are 
available to the public through the University of Canterbury (UC) library database. 
 
On completion, place the questionnaire in the postage-paid, pre-addressed envelope provided 
and post directly to the researcher. A $1 Scratch ‗N Win Ticket has been included with this 
survey in appreciation of your time and assistance with this research. 
 
The project is being carried out as a requirement of a Master of Arts by Andrew Crerar 
under the supervision of Professor Simon Kemp. The researchers can be contacted at 03 356 
2900 and 03 364 2968 respectively. They are pleased to discuss any concerns you may have 
about participation in the project.  
 
The project has been reviewed and approved by the UC Human Ethics Committee. 
 
By completing the questionnaire it will be understood that you have consented to 
participate in the project, and that you consent to publication of the results of the 
project with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved.  
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APPENDIX E 
 
Department of Psychology  
 
Information Sheet 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project into Attitudes towards the ‘Voluntary 
Donations’ system of NZ state schools by assisting the researchers in the contact of your 
student‘s parents and families. Research questionnaires (approved by your school) will be 
posted to a random sample of parents as arranged between the researchers and the school.  
 
Your participation in this research is completely anonymous and any information you supply 
is private. The results of the project may be published, but you can be assured of the complete 
anonymity of data gathered in this investigation. The information that is supplied by the 
parents and families of your students will not be available to you (the principal) or your 
school‘s administration. Participation is optional and you may withdraw your participation, 
including withdrawal of any information you have provided, until the questionnaires have been 
posted to the participants. Contact of the participants will be mediated by the school 
administration and at no time will the researchers be informed of the identities of any 
participants. 
 
Participants will post the completed questionnaires directly to the researchers (unless 
otherwise arranged). A $1 Scratch ‗N Win Ticket will be included with each questionnaire. 
 
The project is being carried out as a requirement of a Master of Arts by Andrew Crerar under 
the supervision of Professor Simon Kemp. The researchers can be contacted at 03 356 2900 
and 03 364 2968 respectively. They are pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about 
participation in the project.  
 
Please note that completed theses are available to the public through the University of 
Canterbury (UC) library database. The final report will be made available to each 
participating school at the completion of the research 
 
The project has been reviewed and approved by the UC Human Ethics Committee. 
